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ABSTRACT 
 For more than thirty years, Pakistan has conducted an irregular warfare campaign 
in Kashmir to wrest control of the disputed region from India while also leveraging its 
nuclear weapons capability. This approach has frustrated a decisive Indian response, 
precipitated multiple crises, and risked nuclear exchange. This thesis analyzes Pakistan’s 
irregular warfare-nuclear deterrence strategy by evaluating Kashmir crises nested within 
three distinct periods of Pakistan’s nuclear capability: de facto, overt, and advanced 
technology. The results suggest Pakistan has successfully employed irregular warfare 
under the nuclear umbrella within Kashmir, but has also incurred great cost by risking 
nuclear exchange, alienating the international community, and destabilizing itself through 
empowerment of violent jihadist groups. As one looks forward to the implications of 
Great Power Competition upon the Indian subcontinent, the dynamics have dramatically 
shifted as the U.S. and China compete for influence. While the U.S. moves closer to 
India, and China to Pakistan, potential polarization of the Kashmir problem presents 
additional nuclear escalation risks. However, emerging opportunities to leverage the 
global powers’ common interest in preventing terrorism could prove a catalyst for South 
Asian stabilization. Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy can also provide insights regarding how 
current or future nuclear-armed regional powers may choose to employ irregular warfare 
to optimize their influence. 
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“The most dangerous place in the world today, I think you could argue, 
is the Indian subcontinent and the line of control in Kashmir.” 1 
     — U.S. President Bill Clinton, 10 March 2000 
 
A. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM 
Conflict precipitating from within Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir 
(J&K)—ranging from low intensity through conventional war to nuclear escalation—has 
raged in its current form for more than thirty years. Central to this ongoing crisis is 
Pakistan’s ongoing revisionist efforts to wrest control of J&K through an irregular warfare 
campaign while leveraging nuclear deterrence to avoid a decisive Indian response. 
Pakistan, the conventionally weaker power vis-à-vis India, has supported a protracted 
Kashmiri resistance since becoming a latent nuclear power in the 1980s that continues 
today.2 Frustrated by the potential nuclear escalation, India has struggled to tailor a 
decisive response against the irregular warfare campaign within J&K.  
This project addresses the relationship between Pakistan’s nuclear program and that 
of its irregular war campaign within J&K. This thesis analyzes Pakistan’s ability to employ 
irregular warfare within J&K while also maintaining nuclear deterrence against India over 
the last thirty years of conflict. It also identifies the consequences of this approach, its 
provocative nature, and the disturbing reality of potential nuclear exchange in South Asia. 
Analyzing Pakistan’s irregular warfare campaign within J&K, coupled with its nuclear 
capability, can provide insights into how regional powers with nuclear capability (or 
aspirations) may choose to engage in hybrid warfare. Therefore, this thesis examines: How 
 
1“The White House: Office of the Press Secretary — Remarks by the President on One America 
Initiative Religious Community Call to Action: [1],” M2 Presswire, Mar 13, 2000, http://libproxy.nps.edu/
login?url=https://www-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/446202330?accountid=12702. 
2 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in 
South Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 9. 
2 
has Pakistan leveraged nuclear weapons to support irregular warfare in Kashmir and how 
can Pakistan’s approach be applied to regional nuclear powers? 
B. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Analysis of the interaction between irregular warfare and nuclear deterrence 
spanned the spectrum of warfare and encompasses an equally broad expanse of literature. 
The sources described below provided an understanding of nuclear warfare, irregular 
warfare, and South Asia-specific issues relevant to this study. First, the author focused on 
theoretical frameworks associated with both nuclear deterrence and irregular warfare. 
Thomas Schelling’s Arms and Influence and The Strategy of Conflict along with Glen 
Snyder’s Deterrence and Defense demonstrated the basis for understanding the deterrence 
relationship between two nuclear-armed competitors. Among these considerations were 
analyses of the cost of fighting, the value of the objective at hand, probability of adversary 
responses, and the ability to successfully hold the opponent’s values at stake.3  
Additional theoretical analysis with respect to irregular warfare was also 
conducted. This included Mao Tse Tung’s definitive work On Guerrilla Warfare which 
provided an illustration of the basic principles for raising and employing a resistance. 
Although Mao’s writing was in the context of a revolutionary uprising against Japanese 
occupiers in a pre-nuclear world, his observations linking irregular warfare activities with 
that of the political objectives of a country proved instructive. Mao consistently cited the 
importance of tying a well-organized resistance movement to that of its national goals.4 
Additionally, in Deception and Deterrence, John Norton Moore described the fundamental 
support of nuclear powers to assist foreign groups to achieve limited objectives as opposed 
to direct confrontation leading to nuclear escalation.5 
 
3 Glenn Herald Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1961), 3. 
4 Mao Tse-Tung, and Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (Auckland: Pickle 
Partners Publishing, 2014), 29. 
5 John Norton Moore, Deception and Deterrence in “Wars of National Liberation,” State-Sponsored 
Terrorism and Other Forms of Secret Warfare (Durham: Academic Press, 1997), 82. 
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The author also reviewed literature specifically related to nuclear dynamics within 
South Asia. Vipin Narang’s Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era provided analysis of 
nuclear deterrent postures that can be specifically applied to regional nuclear-armed 
powers, such as Pakistan. Narang acknowledged that regional powers typically do not 
enjoy the flexibility and capability of superpowers, and must optimize their nuclear 
deterrent capabilities in different ways.6  Narang also described how regional powers 
choose their nuclear strategy through his Posture Optimization Theory. This framework 
illustrated the nuclear posture pursued by a nuclear-armed nation, “optimizes their force 
structure for their external security environment and their internal threat and constraints. 
That is, states carefully calculate what strategy they require to deter their likely foes and 
what they are organizationally and financially capable of doing, and optimize their choice 
of posture in response.”7 This approach emphasized the interaction between a state’s threat 
perceptions, its menu of defense capabilities, and its stature within the international 
community. 
The author also investigated the stability/instability paradox as it pertains to the 
nuclear deterrence-irregular warfare connection within J&K. Michael Krepon’s definition 
of the stability/instability paradox stated that nuclear powers were likely to not fight direct 
wars against each other for fear of nuclear retaliation, but would resort to limited war on a 
broader scale. Thus, the likelihood of nuclear war decreased as the probability of limited, 
indirect conflict increased.8 This concept provided context for Pakistan’s employment of 
irregular warfare under the nuclear shadow within J&K. Other South Asia scholars offered 
additional perspectives regarding the stabilization effect, or lack thereof, within the region. 
In India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur opinions differed 
regarding Pakistan’s nuclear posture. Ganguly asserted that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal 
provided a balancing effect within the region, specifically with India. This capability 
 
6 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 14. 
7 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era,  27. 
8 Michael Krepon, “The stability-instability paradox, misperception, and escalation control in South 
Asia,” Prospects for peace in South Asia (2003), 261. 
4 
ensured that large-scale conventional warfare between the nations is unlikely and the 
adversaries will seek diplomatic solutions to escalatory issues. He contrasted this with the 
costly 1947 and 1965 wars between the countries over J&K that occurred prior to 
operational nuclear capability in South Asia.9 Kapur disagreed, stating that Pakistan’s 
nuclear capabilities provided space to challenge the status quo within South Asia because 
India would not risk decisive conventional campaign in response. He further cited the 
ongoing Pakistan-sponsored insurgency against Indian occupation has resulted in 
dangerous confrontation and escalation on multiple occasions since the 1990s.10 
Kapur presented additional research in Jihad as Grand Strategy that described 
Pakistan’s history of irregular warfare to achieve strategic objectives against its superior 
adversaries. He also discussed the jihadi paradox which brought to light the negative 
internal consequences to Pakistan’s empowerment of insurgent groups.11 This observation 
provided important incites when evaluating the cost-benefits of employing an irregular 
warfare strategy and assisted the author with understanding the limitations of such an 
approach.  
C. METHODOLOGY AND PROJECT BREAKDOWN 
This thesis is comprised of a pre-nuclear historic analysis of Pakistan and three case 
studies that examine various phases of Pakistan’s nuclear capability and its corresponding 
irregular warfare campaign in Kashmir. Each case study focuses on a specific Kashmir 
crisis event precipitated by Pakistan-based irregular warfare; with each instance occurring 
in a distinct phase of Pakistan’s nuclear program. In addition, each scenario describes 
interventions of the international community with regards to diplomatic and de-escalatory 
actions. The final chapter applies the aforementioned studies to the arising challenges 
associated with Great Power Competition and future revision-seeking nuclear armed 
regional powers. Thus, the thesis will proceed in the following sections: 
 
 
9 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia, 3. 
10 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia, 39. 
11 Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 126. 
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1. Pakistan’s Pre-Nuclear History and Early Security Dilemmas 
2. Pakistan’s Latent Nuclear Capability and 1990 Kashmir Crisis 
3. 1998 Nuclear Testing and the Kargil War  
4. Pakistan’s Nuclear Modernization and the Pulwama Crisis  
5. Findings and Application to Nuclear-Armed Regional Powers 
1. Pakistan’s Pre-nuclear History and Early Security Dilemmas 
This research investigates the evolution of Pakistan as a fledgling nation in 1947, 
its defeats against India, and its subsequent pursuit of nuclear weapons. This chapter 
analyzes Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program coupled with its support of jihadis to 
achieve strategic security. The author identifies key conditions, events, and decisions that 
resulted in Pakistan’s irregular warfare-nuclear deterrence grand strategy.  
This chapter provides the historical context from which the next three chapters 
demonstrate Pakistan’s irregular warfare-nuclear deterrent relationship. In addition, it 
examines Pakistan’s decision-making methodology prior to its possession of nuclear 
weapons. The author also identifies the changing demeanor, attitudes, and foreign policy 
decisions upon Pakistan’s realization of nuclear capability. By illustrating the historical 
perspective, the author provides context for Pakistan’s evolving deterrence and security 
strategy. 
2. Pakistan’s Latent Nuclear Capability and the 1990 Kashmir Crisis  
This case study analyzes Pakistan’s early nuclear capability and its support of the 
Kashmir insurgency following the Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan. The 1990 
Kashmir crisis is specifically analyzed for two reasons. First, Pakistan achieved a position 
of de facto nuclear weapons capability thus propelling it into a unique class of nations.12 
Second, the internal conditions within J&K fomented a Kashmiri population weary of 
Indian misrule and open to Pakistan-supported insurgency.13 With these new conditions 
 
12 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of 
Nuclear Weapons (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 2005), 82. 
13 Paul S. Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 98. 
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applied to Pakistan’s ongoing security issues, the author analyzes the impacts on its 
security decision making process and posture within Kashmir.  
3. 1998 Nuclear Test and the Kargil War  
This case study investigates Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear testing and its corresponding 
status as an overt nuclear power; followed by its escalatory crisis and limited war against 
India within J&K. These conditions ultimately make the Kargil War a unique situation: 
nuclear powers conducting kinetic combat operations directly against each other in support 
of limited objectives.14 This situation allows the author to analyze not only Pakistan’s 
employment of irregular warfare in conjunction with overt nuclear weapon capability, but 
also evaluate India’s reaction, risk analysis, and response when faced with this approach. 
4. Pakistan’s Nuclear Modernization and the Pulwama Crisis 
Following the Kargil War and normalizing of relations with India to a tense peace 
over the Kashmir region, Pakistan continued to modernize its nuclear weapons capability 
to maintain positive nuclear deterrence against the more advanced Indian force.15 In 
addition, the 2019 Pulwama crisis represents an escalatory flashpoint in which India 
responded decisively with increased troop presence, revocation of J&K’s autonomous 
status, and internet blackouts within the region. This situation escalated to active combat 
and eventually deescalated, but ultimately remains unresolved.16 The ongoing crisis 
represents the most significant escalation of hostilities over J&K in two decades. With 
Pakistan’s increased nuclear capability and a heavy-handed Indian response to insurgent 
actions within Kashmir, the author argues that an emerging—and uniquely dangerous—
situation exists within the conflict’s nuclear deterrence/irregular warfare relationship. 
 
14 Mark S. Bell and Julia MacDonald, “How Dangerous Was Kargil? Nuclear Crises in Comparative 
Perspective,” The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 2 (April 3, 2019): 136. 
15 “Pakistan’s Nuclear Capabilities,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, August 29, 
2019, https://armscontrolcenter.org/pakistans-nuclear-capabilities/.  
16 Michael Kugelman, “India and Pakistan Are Edging Closer to War in 2020.” Foreign Policy, 
December 31, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/31/afghanistan-taliban-nuclear-india-pakistan-
edging-closer-war-2020/. 
7 
5. Findings and Application to Nuclear-Armed Regional Powers 
The final section summarizes the findings and trends within Pakistan’s journey as 
a regional actor throughout the spectrum of nuclear capability and its corresponding 
support of irregular forces in Kashmir. In addition, the author applies the ongoing Kashmir 
crisis to future polarization of the region within the emerging tensions between U.S. and 
China for influence in South Asia. This section identifies common interests in the region, 
but also cautions the potential for greater escalatory risk. Finally, the author applies 
Pakistan’s approach to other regional powers that may seek nuclear weapons and choose 
to employ irregular warfare capabilities.  
  
8 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
9 
II. PAKISTAN’S PRE-NUCLEAR HISTORY AND EARLY 
SECURITY DILEMMAS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the historical perspective necessary to 
understand the follow-on case studies which analyze the relationship between Pakistan’s 
irregular warfare campaign in Kashmir and its various stages of nuclear capability. The 
first section will explain the early history of Pakistan, beginning with the decolonization of 
British India. It will describe the three significant wars that Pakistan fought against India 
from 1947 to 1971. This section will identify the successes, failures, and corresponding 
strategic decisions made by Pakistan in the wake of its emergence as a nation. The second 
section will focus on Pakistan’s nuclear program, describing its origins, struggles, and 
pathways to the bomb. It will also describe Pakistan’s leverage of the Soviet-Afghan War 
to facilitate its final measures to achieve nuclear latency. This section also identifies 
Pakistan’s reorientation toward irregular warfare in Kashmir through successful 
employment of mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
B. PAKISTAN’S EMERGENCE AS A NATION 
In August 1947, Great Britain officially relinquished control of colonial India 
creating the countries of India and Pakistan. Under the recently developed two-nation 
theory, which divided the colony along ethnic boundaries, emerged the Muslim-aligned 
state of Pakistan. However The Partition, as it was known, of colonial India was marked 
by haste and disorganization. Great Britain sought to quickly divest from its eastern 
territory and focus entirely on repairing the catastrophic damage from World War Two. 
This presented the fledgling nation with serious challenges that defined its early history.17 
Geographically, Pakistan’s sovereign territory was comprised of West (present day 
Pakistan) and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). These territories were separated by roughly 
1,000 miles. This caused numerous command and control issues between the entities as 
 
17 Crispin Bates, The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies, British Broadcasting Company, 
March 3rd, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/partition1947_01.shtml. 
10 
well as divided Pakistan’s military assets to protect the entirety of its territory. In addition, 
West Pakistan was physically narrow with limited strategic depth to defend its national 
assets. Specifically, its major cities of Islamabad and Lahore sat within 100 miles of India’s 
borders presenting a potential security dilemma. The India-Pakistan division also favored 
India economically as the prime agricultural and industrial areas remained within Indian 
borders.18 
Militarily, Pakistan did not fare any better during The Partition. The Partition 
agreement stated that Pakistan would receive 17.5 percent of British India’s financial assets 
and 30 percent of its military resources. However, this separation never occurred in full as 
India recognized that it was within its best interest to limit Pakistan’s strength. Once The 
Partition was complete, Pakistan had only received approximately 15 percent of its 
promised ordnance.19 
Politically, Pakistan also suffered. The Indian state had inherited a well-organized 
and effective administration system from Britain allowing India a comparatively simple 
transition within its bureaucracy. In contrast, Pakistan’s political institutions were never 
developed because Britain had primarily utilized the region as a frontier expanse meant to 
provide a defensive western buffer. The resultant political and ideological turmoil between 
Pakistan’s government, military, and intelligence communities plagued the nation’s 
stability and continues to threaten its security today.20  
Pakistan’s disaffection following The Partition precipitated distrust and conflict 
with India. Three wars will be discussed to demonstrate the evolution of Pakistan’s 
employment of proxy forces to deter aggressions: the First Kashmir War, the Second 
Kashmir War, and the Bangladesh War. The lessons learned comparing Pakistan’s success 
and failures with respect to its irregular warfare campaigns set the stage for its modern 
employment that will be analyzed in follow-on chapters. 
 
18 Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 21. 
19 Jerry Meyrle, Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: A Brief History, DRP-
2012-U-003250-Final (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 2012), 3.  
20 Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 35. 
11 
C. FIRST KASHMIR WAR 
The First Kashmir War commenced immediately upon British India’s division into 
the modern nations of Pakistan and India in 1947. During The Partition, the question 
regarding which nation the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) would ultimately 
become a member remained. This province contained a super-majority Muslim population 
(approximately 75%), aligning it culturally with Pakistan under the two-nation theory.21 
However, the ruler of Kashmir Maharaja Hari Singh was Hindu and closely tied to India. 
J&K remained unaligned even following the August 1947 Partition. This situation 
presented Pakistan with a dilemma. In its estimation, the two-nation theory justified 
acquisition of J&K on account of the region’s preponderance of Muslim citizens. Afterall, 
Pakistan was created as a nation within this context quite literally during the same time 
period.22  
The acquisition of J&K could potentially reinforce Pakistan’s Islamic identity and 
provide a uniting factor for the fledgling nation.23 In addition, Kashmir resides on a 
resource economically essential for a growing population: fresh water. Several rivers 
flowing from the Siachen Glacier weave through J&K, making it susceptible to diversion 
by India to the detriment of Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan had a domestic incentive to 
acquire this region as well.24 
Although the logic for acquisition of J&K by Pakistan appeared legitimate, the 
questions of ways and means remained. Pakistan’s military and command structure 
presented no match for India’s professional forces and a conventional attempt to wrest 
control of J&K would assuredly result in war with India. However, Pakistan did have a 
shared cultural identity and had developed relationships with Islamic leaders within J&K. 
This presented Pakistan with an opportunity to support an internal J&K uprising. Within 
these conditions, Pakistan chose to pursue conflict that would foment a grass-roots Muslim 
 
21 Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 3. 
22 Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad (New York: Routledge, 2007) 18. 
23 Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 21. 
24 Shawn Snow, “Analysis: Why Kashmir Matters,” The Diplomat, September 19, 2016. 
12 
uprising against the Hindu-controlled J&K. Furthermore, Pakistan could facilitate a larger 
offensive from Pakistan tribesmen willing to conduct jihad to liberate Muslim Kashmiris 
from the Hindu government of India. The combined effort of these factions would facilitate 
a rapid advance upon J&K’s capital of Srinagar, completing a fait accompli. This situation 
would force the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan and prevent India’s timely response to 
counter Pakistan’s offensive.25  
Pakistan’s approach would rely heavily on deep-rooted Muslim animosity towards 
the Hindu government within the Poonch region of J&K to foment rebellion while the 
Pakistan military provided non-attributable weapons and materiel support. This initial 
phase would destabilize the Maharaja’s regime and set conditions for tribesmen from 
Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province to invade J&K from the west, with their objective 
being to occupy the Kashmir Valley and its capital of Srinagar. Pakistan would facilitate 
this unconventional warfare campaign through initial planning and resourcing, but would 
not contribute significant support during the combat phase to prevent attribution.26  
Pakistan began the war on October 22, 1947, following months of planning and 
resourcing. The 4th J&K Infantry in Poonch successfully mutinied against its Indian 
leadership, established control, and facilitated the invasion of the Pakistani tribesmen. The 
combined force began its advance toward Srinagar, but lost momentum as tribesmen halted 
their movement in favor of pillaging the countryside. This operational pause created space 
for India’s timely reaction.27  
In response to the rapid and surprising advance, Hari Singh pleaded to India for 
military support to protect his regime. India agreed to respond on October 26, but only after 
Singh committed to accede J&K to India once hostilities had concluded. India quickly 
mobilized, deployed, and stymied the Muslim advance on Srinagar. Akhbar Kahn, the 
Pakistani orchestrator and field commander, attempted to leverage support from the 
combined group under further auspices of jihad, but his efforts proved futile when the 
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hodgepodge and undisciplined irregular force balked at these orders. The Indian Army 
expelled the invasion force from the Kashmir Valley and successfully protected Srinagar 
by the end of November 1947.28  
Pakistan and India fought to a stalemate through the winter months of early 1948. 
India attempted a Spring offensive to totally reestablish the pre-war J&K boundary, but 
was ultimately unsuccessful. Pakistan chose to escalate the conflict by committing 
conventional forces upon a new front into the Ladakh region of J&K, but was quickly 
repulsed. Indian threats of a large-scale invasion of Pakistan along with diplomatic 
engagement with the United Nations (UN) to mandate total control of the pre-war J&K 
proved unsuccessful. An UN-brokered ceasefire on January 1, 1949, concluded the war, 
with Pakistan occupying a third of the J&K region and India retaining the eastern two-
thirds of the territory.29  
Although the First Kashmir War ended largely as a stalemate, with India gaining 
control of the most important areas of J&K—the Kashmir Valley and Srinagar—Pakistan 
did gain insights regarding irregular warfare within the region that would affect its future 
approach. First, Pakistan experienced the positive and negative ramifications of a limited-
support unconventional warfare campaign. In addition, the call to unification in support of 
Muslim ethnic groups proved a somewhat effective catalyst for a revisionist campaign.30  
Pakistan chose to equip and employ the Kashmir uprisers and Pakistani tribesman 
while limiting their connection to the state. However, they did not provide additional 
military training in tactics or effectively organize and discipline these units. Pakistan 
prioritized an approach that would decrease the probability of connection between the 
Pakistani state and the invaders. This approach assumed symmetry in intentions between 
the irregular troops and that of the Pakistani state: a swift occupation on Srinagar. Although 
the troops moved rapidly to within 35 miles of the capital, the irregulars lost momentum. 
 
28 Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad, 24. 
29 Arif Jamal, Shadow War (New York: Melville House Publishing, 2009), 57. 
30 Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad, 86. 
14 
The responsive Indian force drove the irregulars from Baramula by early November, with 
the tribesmen retiring from the battlefield, convinced of defeat.31  
Although this operation did initially mask Pakistan’s support to the irregular effort, 
it failed to provide the necessary command and control to ensure that the objective was 
realized. Had a greater presence of cadre been present to influence, direct, and support the 
tribesmen, perhaps Srinagar may have fallen. However, the element’s lack of focus 
provided India the ability to respond quickly and decisively by airlifting a response force 
directly to the Srinagar airport and quickly repel the offensive.32  
Ideological fervor propelled the initial uprising and motivated Pakistani tribesman 
to action. However, the Islamic identity did not coalesce the force enough to see through 
the entire operation. Although unsuccessful in achieving lasting effects, Pakistan would 
use the call to jihad to motivate its constituency in the future.33  
D. SECOND KASHMIR WAR 
Although the First Kashmir War ended in stalemate, Pakistan remained committed 
to the accession of J&K. Aware of the undisciplined and ill-planned irregular warfare 
approach employed in 1947, Pakistan would employ a more aggressive unconventional 
warfare campaign. This involved a cadre of Pakistani Special Services Group soldiers to 
motivate, train, equip, and lead irregulars from Pakistani Kashmir in guerilla warfare 
operations. Recent bouts of intense anti-governmental unrest would then tip the balance in 
favor of Pakistan in the region. Then, a follow-on conventional operation would 
consolidate gains and reinforce positions in the Kashmir Valley, resulting in seizure of the 
province. The two phases of this operation were referred to as Operation Gibraltar and 
Operation Grand Slam.34  
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Pakistan’s plan to conquer J&K hinged upon two assumptions that turned out to be 
false: the Kashmiri population would rise in violent rebellion when supported with Pakistan 
assistance and that India was not poised to respond with overwhelming military force. 
During the infiltration phase of Operation Gibraltar, the Pakistani force successfully 
inserted 7,500 fighters into J&K in three weeks. Although the forces had infiltrated with 
success, Kashmiris did not respond as suspected. In fact, Kashmiri citizens were the first 
to compromise these fighters by alerting Indian authorities. India responded quickly, 
sealing off the Kashmiri border to J&K thereby isolating the infiltrators and rendering them 
ineffective.35  
Pakistan ordered Operation Grand Slam to begin on September 1, 1965, but its 
mobilization proved disorganized and sluggish. India responded overwhelmingly and 
repelled the Pakistan Army’s advance. The Indians escalated the conflict beyond J&K and 
propelled a massive offensive toward Lahore and Sialkot within Pakistan’s territory. The 
belligerents eventually fought to a stalemate that was resolved by a UN ceasefire two weeks 
later that reestablished the antebellum boundaries.36  
Although unable to achieve Pakistan’s objectives, Pakistan achieved operational 
success during its planning, infiltration, and employment phases of Operation Gibraltar. 
The irregular force was able to establish surprise and initially attrite Indian forces to gain 
operational momentum. However, Pakistan failed to understand the operational 
environment and set conditions within J&K to ensure a massive and rapid overthrow of 
Indian forces. This was largely due to Pakistani leadership prioritizing secrecy for this 
operation. Thus, the J&K resistance leaderships’ opinions where not solicited on this 
approach. Because they mistakenly assessed the Muslim disturbances to be stronger than 
they were, Pakistan incorrectly assessed the J&K population’s willingness to violently 
rebel. Furthermore, Operation Grand Slam’s reliance on conventional forces proved to be 
disorganized and improperly executed. India eventually suppressed both, but not before 
irregular troops had inflicted significant losses and demonstrated India’s vulnerable 
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political control within J&K. Thus, from an irregular warfare perspective, Pakistan viewed 
this approach as a viable option for success.37 After its experience in the 1971 Bangladesh 
War and its devastating conventional defeat, the irregular warfare approach became even 
more attractive in the face of a more technically advanced adversary. 
The jihadist phase of this operation illuminated positive and negative components 
of the irregular warfare campaign. First, the religion-fused irregular force from Pakistan 
proved to be motivated, focused, and capable. This reinforced the use of jihad to leverage 
the movement. However, Pakistan grossly miscalculated the Kashmiri willingness to 
overthrow its local government, even with its longstanding grievances. It became evident 
that Pakistan would need to cooperate more closely with Kashmiri dissenters prior to 
conducting irregular operations, rather than assume the mere presence of Pakistani forces 
would sway popular support. Kashmiris valued independence and would not blindly follow 
Pakistan’s wishes.38 Thus, greater investment toward building underground networks 
within J&K that could influence the population, recruit fighters, and train them for 
operations was required. This would allow the force to increase its military prowess and 
enhance the likelihood of success when encountering a robust Indian response.39  
E. BANGLADESH WAR 
In contrast to the First and Second Kashmir Wars that employed a degree of 
successful irregular force, Pakistani military operations during the Bangladesh War were 
almost entirely conventional. The war resulted in a complete loss for Pakistan: significant 
degradation to its warfighting capacity and greater geographic isolation with its loss of East 
Pakistan (Bangladesh).40  The war began with India-supported uprisings in East Pakistan 
followed by assaults of Indian troops in November of 1971. To divert attention from its 
beleaguered force in East Pakistan, President Yahya Kahn ordered an attack on various 
airbases within India from West Pakistan on December 3. This justified India’s 
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conventional invasion of East Pakistan and a corresponding offensive against West 
Pakistan which devastated the air and naval headquarters in Peshawar and Karachi. 
Pakistan’s incursions into India were easily defeated, as India successfully leveraged its 
two-to-one to 1 conventional military advantage.41  
After 14 days of combat, Pakistan’s Army was completely defeated. Over 9,000 
Pakistani soldiers were killed along with more than 200 tanks and 75 aircraft destroyed. 
India suffered approximately a third of these losses. Humiliatingly, upwards of 90,000 
Pakistani soldiers had surrendered and 5,000 square kilometers of Pakistan’s sovereign 
territory had been secured by Indian forces at the end of hostilities.42  
F. POST-BANGLADESH WAR INITIATIVES 
Immediately following Pakistan’s loss of Bangladesh, disgraced President Yahya 
Khan stepped down and former Foreign Minister Zulfikar Bhutto assumed control of the 
nation. His first order was the negotiation of war termination conditions. The Simla 
Accords officially relinquished control of Bangladesh from Pakistan. However, Bhutto did 
secure the release of 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and retained the 5,000 square 
kilometers of sovereign territory overwhelmed by Indian forces during the war.43 Of note, 
the Simla Accord established the Line of Control (LoC) between Pakistan-controlled 
Kashmir and Indian-controlled J&K as recognized by the international community in 
present day.44  
Bhutto then reassessed Pakistan’s revisionist goals within Kashmir. He decided to 
de-value Pakistani-supported irregular warfare in the near term. The risk of escalation with 
India during a time of utmost asymmetry in military capability presented an unacceptable 
risk. However, the issue remained present as Bhutto stated in 1972 regarding the Kashmir 
conflict: “I cannot go to war. Not in the next 5, 10, or 15 years ... if tomorrow the people 
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of Kashmir start a freedom movement … we will be with them … we will fight if we want 
to fight. … this is an eternal position.”45 Although Kashmir remained an important issue, 
Bhutto understood through Pakistan’s experience that such revisionist claims required 
greater preparation. Conditions needed to be properly set—internal and external to J&K—
for the policy to work. Decisive to this revisionist mentality happened to be the very factor 
that would also deter existential threats: nuclear weapons. In fact, Bhutto’s claims proved 
accurate as Paul Kapur points out in Dangerous Deterrent: “1972 through 1989 was 
relatively peaceful both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 186 of the 216 months during 
this period were completely free of militarized disputes, and the disputes that did occur 
remained at fairly low hostility levels.” 46  The resurgence in violence within Kashmir 
occurred as Pakistan’s nuclear dream was fully realized following this time period.  
Internationally, Bhutto reassessed his relationship with the West. During its early 
history, Pakistan found itself in the middle of the larger Cold War, dealing with varying 
interests between the United States, Soviet Union, and China. As a fledgling nation, 
Pakistan sought protection from these powers at different periods. Pakistan had entered 
into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which provided a counter to Soviet-
aligned India. As Pakistan drew closer to the U.S., this provoked the Soviet Union to 
strengthen its relationship with India and Afghanistan to provide it further regional 
support.47  
In President Bhutto’s estimation, the partnership with the U.S. had not yielded the 
international leverage or regional protection Pakistan required to ensure its sovereignty, 
but had simply enhanced Cold War tensions in the region. This was especially evident 
when the U.S. took punitive action against Pakistan by withdrawing military aid during the 
Second Kashmir War of 1965. The Bangladesh War further separated Pakistan from U.S. 
interests, as the U.S. deferred the diplomatic space for the Simla Accords to be brokered 
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by the Soviet Union. In response, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO and cut ties with its 
former colonial rulers by leaving the British Commonwealth of Nations.48 Although 
Pakistan maintained steady relations with China in their “all weather friendship” China did 
not come to its defense over Bangladesh for fear of escalating a regional war with India.49 
It became apparent that South Asia issues were not of the utmost importance to the larger 
nations. Pakistan served as a proxy to further their interests, but these powers would not 
expend extensive capital to protect Pakistan from India.50  
The Bhutto Administration then sought to increase its relationship with Middle 
Eastern Muslim countries. In 1972, Bhutto made two visits to the region to shore up 
diplomatic and financial support. In addition, Pakistan hosted the Islamic Summit 
Conference in 1974 to address a myriad of ongoing issues within the Middle East. This 
conference proved to be successful at drawing support from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran; 
relationships that would prove vital to Pakistan’s aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons.51 
India’s self-described “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE) in 1974 furthered 
Bhutto’s “us vs. them” narrative. Upon demonstration of this capability, Bhutto introduced 
the concept of an “Islamic Bomb.” He reasoned that Western democratic nations, 
Communists, and Hindus all had this capability. To stay relevant and gain prestige, a 
Muslim country must attain nuclear weapons status. Among Islamic nations, Pakistan was 
best poised to do so. Bhutto’s assessment was met with overwhelming support from 
Pakistan’s population along with external Islamic actors.52  
The Pakistan government’s appeal to Islamic nations in the Middle East was wildly 
successful as multiple countries provided financial and technical assistance in support of 
the bomb throughout the decade. Because of the immense financial costs of a nuclear 
weapons program coupled with Pakistan’s deleterious status following the Bangladesh 
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War, external investment was essential. Libya’s financial assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear 
program is estimated to be as much as $500 million. In addition, Libyan-owned uranium 
deposits in Chad as well as 450 tons of yellow cake were provided to Pakistan. In return, 
Pakistan agreed to share nuclear technology with Libyan scientists.53 Additionally, Bhutto 
secured upwards of $900 million in loans from Muslim states, primarily Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, to fund fuel cycle facilities required for nuclear energy production.54  
G. PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM   
Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear energy began with the assistance of the U.S. during 
President Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program in 1954. This program 
attempted to control the proliferation of nuclear material and technical knowledge to 
countries desiring the benefits of nuclear energy. In turn, the receiving countries would 
agree to forego nuclear weapons in the future while also providing the United States access 
for monitoring of their program. With support of this program, Pakistan founded its Atomic 
Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1957.55  
The PAEC initially sought nuclear technology principally for energy production to 
support its growing population and ameliorate its lack of internal energy resources.56 
However, this changed with the growing asymmetry in defense between Pakistan and India 
and the region’s constant state of posturing or outright conflict since 1947. A growing 
influential population within the Pakistani government, led by future President Zulfiqur 
Bhutto, began communicating a desire for nuclear weapons to counter India. In addition, 
India had signaled an intent to pursue nuclear weapons following China’s October 16, 
1964, successful nuclear explosion. The Second Kashmir War of 1965 war had also 
demonstrated a level of conventional military disparity between India and Pakistan. It was 
in this context that Bhutto’s now infamous quote emphatically referenced Pakistan’s need 
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to achieve a nuclear weapon at all cost, even if it meant “eating grass.” Upon completion 
of the Bangladesh War post-hostilities, Bhutto set upon rebuilding Pakistan amidst a time 
of depleted power and low morale. The utmost priority was acquiring nuclear weapons to 
prevent another catastrophic defeat at the hand of India. India’s 1974 PNE in many ways 
vindicated Bhutto’s approach and justified Pakistan’s efforts to meet India’s capability on 
the subcontinent.57 Pakistan’s ongoing security concerns and its distrust of the 
international community, along with India’s refusal to sign the landmark Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), informed Pakistan’s decision not to as well. These security concerns, in 
Pakistan’s estimation, were validated following its bloody and embarrassing defeat in 1971 
to India.58  
Pakistan’s post-Bangladesh War quest for nuclear weapons is characterized by a 
multi-layered approach, both above board and clandestine, to achieve this status. This 
initiative was greatly impacted by early international nonproliferation initiatives in the 
form of the NPT, International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards, and the 
London Suppliers Group (later to become the Nuclear Suppliers Group).59 The U.S. also 
pursued further actions to thwart Pakistan’s attempt to achieve nuclear weapons status 
through the Symington and Glenn Amendments that severely limited military and 
economic assistance to non-NPT signatories that were seeking a nuclear program.60  
Although non-proliferation efforts hindered Pakistan’s ability to receive uranium 
enrichment technology and stunted its pace for achieving nuclear capability, Pakistan 
acquired nuclear latency sometime in the mid-1980s.61 This was completed through a 
massive and complex procurement network led by the now infamous A.Q. Khan. This 
system leveraged sympathetic and opportunistic countries, companies, and individuals 
willing to circumvent emerging international constraints. Examples include buying critical 
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individual components rather than restricted end items; utilizing intermediaries to veil the 
final destination of equipment and supplies in order to bypass restrictions; exploiting 
timelines of various agreements to quickly acquire necessary equipment prior to treaty 
enforcement; reverse engineering components; and providing justification for procurement 
of equipment under the auspices of non-military purposes.62 Pakistan also received 
additional financial support from Saudi Arabia and Libya to produce an indigenous 
uranium production facility when its Plutonium program floundered due to international 
restrictions.63 Feroz Hassan Khan sums up this “all in” approach in his detailed account of 
Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb by saying:  
For A.Q. Khan and others who were involved in procurement activities, 
however, acquiring the necessary knowledge and components for the 
nuclear program was a call to the highest level of national service at a time 
when Pakistan’s security and survivability were at stake. Dedicated people 
who were determined to overcome all technical and political hurdles placed 
before the Pakistani nuclear program were prepared not just to “eat grass” 
but also to take extraordinary risks—at times with their lives—in the 
underworld of nuclear procurement, all in the name of technology and 
national capacity.64  
This highlights the risks that Bhutto and his successor (and deposer) President Zia Al-Haq 
were willing to accept regarding international coercion in order to achieve defensive parity 
and support their revisionist agenda. 
H. OPPORTUNITIES FROM THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, would significantly 
change the dynamics for Pakistan regarding both its nuclear weapons program and its 
irregular warfare capability. Pakistan would successfully leverage its unique geographical 
position and access to mujahedeen fighters to support U.S. efforts that negated recent 
efforts to punish the country for its nuclear endeavors. In addition, Zia would successfully 
protect his western border while gaining influence in the country upon the Soviet Union’s 
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defeat and the rise of the Taliban. All the while, Pakistan would refocus its priorities on 
Kashmir by leveraging foreign investments and irregular warfare experience in 
Afghanistan to set conditions for a revitalized campaign. The 1980s would end with 
Pakistan emerging as a highly latent nuclear power with a developed, battle-tested irregular 
warfare capability and re-established influence within J&K.65 
The Soviet presence in Afghanistan caused Pakistan to be surrounded by 
adversaries. Pakistan’s attempt to acquire strategic depth in Afghanistan had already 
occurred in in the mid-1970s when it provided support to mujahedeen insurgents to 
destabilize the Soviet-supported government. However, with the outright invasion of the 
Soviet Union of Afghanistan in 1979, and the subsequent U.S. fixation to contain them, 
provided Pakistan an opportunity to greatly enhance its interests. President Zia sought to 
leverage the U.S.’s desire to render a Soviet defeat in Afghanistan to develop its 
unconventional warfare capacity in Kashmir and complete Pakistan’s realization of a 
functional nuclear weapon.66  
Zia would level anti-Soviet fervor to achieve nuclear weapons status and 
reinvigorate the Kashmir insurgency in three ways. First, he would secure U.S. financial 
support from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. In total, the U.S. provided over $7 billion dollars 
of military aid to support the anti-Soviet insurgency. Saudi Arabia reportedly provided a 
similar amount of financial support.67 Zia sought to utilize this massive investment beyond 
simply supporting the mujahedeen. Zia successfully filtered all foreign investment through 
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), masking its distribution and providing an opportunity 
to disseminate the funding beyond simply the insurgency in Afghanistan.68 Estimates 
claim that up to 30% of funding had been repurposed in support of Kashmir insurgents 
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during this era. Zia saw these two initiatives so linked that he referred to the Soviet-Afghan 
War as the “Kashmir jihad.”69  
Zia also sought protection from international criticism of its nuclear program. The 
U.S. would see Pakistan as an anti-Soviet ally and accept nuclear activity if it fully 
supported U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan. The U.S. then removed military and 
economic sanctions applied under the Carter Administration. In addition, the 1984 Pressler 
Amendment required the U.S. to impose sanctions if Pakistan was in possession of a 
nuclear device. The Reagan Administration certified to Congress that this was not the case, 
freeing up funding of approximately $300 Million per year. This was done even as the 
Reagan Administration reportedly knew Pakistan had the capacity to enrich Uranium-235 
above the weapon-capable threshold.70 Although the agreement tacitly allowed Pakistan 
to continue its program, the U.S. insisted that it cease nuclear tests. However, Pakistan still 
succeeded in secretly testing an explosive device in 1986 while also achieving a level of 
93.6% Uranium enrichment.71 At this point, Pakistan had achieved latency where policy 
could no longer prevent nuclear breakout. Bob Woodward’s 1986 Washington Post article 
Pakistan Reported Near Atom Arms Production highlights this: 
Another [United States] official said Pakistan could assemble a bomb within 
two weeks. Another well-informed source said it could be done in a shorter 
time and, in practical terms, Pakistan is only “two screwdriver turns” from 
having a fully assembled bomb. Despite this evidence, sources said, keeping 
Pakistan from obtaining a bomb is a low priority on the list of administration 
foreign policy goals. Said one senior official directly involved in monitoring 
the program, “This administration wouldn’t come down on Pakistan if we 
found a bomb in Zia’s basement.”72 
Woodward’s summary emphasizes the U.S.’s willingness to compromise its earlier policy 
towards Pakistan to levy a strategic defeat against the Soviet Union. As Vipin Narang 
describes in his article Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation, Pakistan utilized the “sheltered 
 
69 Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy, 75. 
70 Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, 78. 
71 Woodward, “Pakistan Reported Near Atoms Arms Production.” 
72 Woodward, “Pakistan Reported Near Atoms Arms Production.” 
25 
pursuer” strategy to achieve nuclear capability. Just as international pressure was most 
harsh, Pakistan successfully leveraged the U.S. single-minded South Asian approach of 
Soviet containment and utilized its support to forego international scrutiny.73 
Third, Zia reestablished Pakistan’s insurgent-support network between Pakistan-
controlled Kashmir and J&K. This was done largely to avoid the operational mistakes of 
the Second Kashmir War where operational preparation did not precipitate the predicted 
uprising. Zia garnered the support of the jihadist group Jamat-i-Islami’s leader Maulana 
Abdul Bari. Bari had fought in the First and Second Kashmir wars and was aware of each 
operation’s shortcomings. Although initially skeptical, Bari agreed to accept Pakistani 
support as funding and weapons were diverted from Afghanistan to J&K in support of these 
efforts.74  
President Zia empowered the ISI to provide the training, supplies, and propaganda 
material while the Kashmiris would employ the militiamen to carry out the uprising. The 
ISI would also assist the development of a Kashmiri intelligence network to indicate when 
conditions were optimized for a successful uprising within J&K. In the mid-1980s, ISI 
agents, at the behest of President Zia, began building a relationship with another J&K 
resistance group, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The JKLF represented 
an oppressed faction of Kashmiri Muslims opposed to Indian policies and corrupt 
governing within the region.75 The ISI produced propaganda booklets to build its guerrilla 
population base and strengthen the organization. Splinter groups were pressured to join 
under the JKLF and receive training in Pakistan and Afghanistan, eventually returning to 
J&K to act as sleeper cells. By 1988, 300 such cells were in Kashmir Valley alone with 
several others spreading into Kishtwar, Dodad, Jammu, Poonch, and Ladakh districts.76 
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The total number of militants numbered around 10,000 and were well organized into 50 
different fighting formations.77  
I. CONCLUSION 
By the late-1980s, Pakistan had positioned itself as a nascent nuclear power with 
an established network of ISI-backed irregular warriors within J&K. In addition, they had 
waged successful jihad with the support of the U.S. against the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan. With their new-found nuclear deterrence capability and reprised jihadist 
insurgency movement, Pakistan was again poised to seriously challenge India with its 
Kashmir revisionist agenda for the first time in almost three decades. 
This chapter surveyed Pakistan’s early history, identifying its security struggles as 
well as limitations and opportunities within the larger international community. It showed 
how the nation transitioned from The Partition, fought three bloody conflicts, and then 
arose to a latent nuclear status over the first 40 years of its existence. In addition, the chapter 
demonstrated how Pakistan’s combat experience informed its views of how to best 
leverage irregular warfare capability as an emergent nuclear-armed nation.  
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III. PAKISTAN’S LATENT NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND THE 
1990 KASHMIR CRISIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the conditions leading to the 1990 Kashmir crisis, its 
culmination and de-escalation, and its aftermath. This crisis is analyzed because it 
represents the first escalatory event over J&K between Pakistan and India since the Second 
Kashmir War of 1965.78 Furthermore, it is the first Kashmir crisis in which both countries 
possessed a de facto nuclear capability. Although not declared nuclear powers, India and 
Pakistan were considered either capable of employing nuclear weapons or able to produce 
them in short order.79 Although scholars argue the level of capability possessed at this 
point, that may prove to be irrelevant. As will be illustrated, the mere potential of this 
emerging capability precipitated emergency diplomatic intervention from the U.S. to 
deescalate the situation. Also of interest, although this third party intervention deescalated 
the conventional and nuclear aspect of the crisis, irregular warfare continued to wage at 
intense levels; developing a level of “new normal” regarding acceptable levels of violence 
within the region that continued for a decade. 
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, the conflict within Kashmir that formed 
the proximal cause of the 1990 escalation event will be described. Second, the 1990 
Kashmir crisis itself, beginning in January and deescalating in May of that year will be 
framed in regard to escalatory components and the subsequent U.S. decision to intervention 
and deescalate. The third section will analyze this crisis in the context of the 
stability/instability paradox. 
B. PRELUDE TO THE CRISIS: TURMOIL IN KASHMIR 
By the late 1980s, Pakistan had reinvigorated the insurgency movement within 
Kashmir and was waiting for the optimal conditions to employ its revisionist agenda. In 
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addition, the last decade had seen increased dissatisfaction of Indian misrule within J&K 
amongst its Muslim population.80 India had increasingly eroded J&K’s historic status as 
an autonomous state by fostering political influence directly from New Delhi. Furthermore, 
a young and educated Muslim population within J&K was growing restless with its 
isolation from the political process.81 The disputed J&K assembly elections in April 1987 
provided the catalyst for a greater degree of violent activity as the new surge of irregular 
warfare began.82 
The 1987 Kashmir elections involved substantial New Delhi intervention into the 
political process. This included the unification of the Hindu National Conference and 
Congress parties at the behest of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi to defeat the Muslim 
United Front claiming a super-majority of representation within the J&K assembly.83 
Conduct during the election was also fraught with corruption as reports of ballot box 
stuffing, intimidation at the polls, and outright denial of voting rights permeated throughout 
the region. This destroyed the credibility of the India-supported J&K government and 
alienated the Kashmiri Muslim population. Along with Pakistan’s support of the latent 
Islamic insurgency, the election improprieties precipitated the population’s decision to 
resort to violence. Pakistan was prepared to leverage this conflict in support of its 
revisionist aims for the first time since 1965.84 
The outrage that had enveloped J&K was quickly leveraged by the ISI who had 
patiently restricted the JKLF and Jamaat-e-Islami until conditions were set to optimize a 
violent attempt to wrest control of Kashmir. Following the botched elections, the ISI 
continued supporting its underground apparatus until the commencement of open 
hostilities on July 31, 1988, when the jihadist detonated two bombs against Indian 
infrastructure within Srinagar. The Indian security forces responded with mass arrests of 
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young Muslims, sparking increased popular unrest and insurgent violence that catapulted 
the region into a near civil war.85 
Violence targeting Indian intelligence, military, and political personnel along with 
Kashmiri Hindus continued through 1988 and 1989. Pakistan-supported jihadist groups 
targeted the Indian intelligence network, killing four operatives. The JKLF also 
commenced a campaign of assassination and intimidation against members of the National 
Conference Party. The jihadist movement succeeded in intimidating Kashmiri voters from 
participating in Indian Parliamentary elections in November 1989. The early stages of the 
insurgency effectively eroded India’s legitimacy and control within J&K.86  
Events in December 1989 and January 1990 saw even greater brutality, propelling 
the situation within Kashmir from sub-regional violence to escalation at the national level 
between Pakistan and India. First, JKLF militants kidnapped the daughter of Kashmiri 
Congress member and India’s appointed Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed while 
demanding that five insurgents be released who were being held on terrorism charges. This 
kidnapping was symbolic in that Sayeed had been appointed by New Delhi and represented 
India’s perceived overreach into Kashmiri sovereignty. The Kashmiri government under 
Farooq Abdullah capitulated and accepted the deal, at the demand of New Delhi and against 
the wishes of Abdullah. As Abdullah predicted, the negotiation fostered increased 
violence—and legitimacy—for the JKLF.87  
In response to the increased violence and organized resistance from Islamic 
insurgents, New Delhi attempted to restore order through a heavy-handed 
counterinsurgency campaign. This included the deployment of hundreds of thousands of 
Indian troops and paramilitary forces to Kashmir to quell the violence under the new J&K 
Governor Jagmohan Malhotra. This was Jagmohan’s second tour as governor and he had 
already garnered a reputation for employing an aggressive approach to countering 
militancy within Kashmir. Islamic militants responded by transitioning their actions to 
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increased offensive operations against Indian military targets including convoys and 
military patrols. Jagmohan responded with systematic clearances of Kashmiri homes and 
strict enforcement of curfews to aggressively disrupt insurgents.88 This martial rule 
resulted in various mass Kashmiri protests that culminated with the January 21, 1990, 
Gawkadal Massacre in which at least 32 protestors were killed by Indian forces.89 
The connection between these events marked an escalation in ISI-supported 
insurgent violence coupled with India’s willingness to employ draconian measures to 
maintain its authority and prevent any notion that it would allow J&K to separate. These 
conditions also ushered in the 1990 Kashmir crisis by compelling both Indian and Pakistani 
national leadership to address the violence, posture their formal military apparatus, and 
implicitly leverage their de facto nuclear capability. 
C. THE CRISIS 
The events in January 1990 transformed the Kashmir insurgency from a sub-
regional context into a Pakistan-India showdown incorporating the full spectrum of 
military capabilities that was only dampened through direct diplomatic efforts from the 
United States. Conventional escalation was initially demonstrated by massive mobilization 
of conventional forces within both countries, coupled with increasingly bellicose rhetoric 
from diplomats and political leaders on both sides of the border. 
India continued its deployment of several hundred thousands of troops within 
Kashmir and nearby Punjab, with the stated purpose of border security to prevent jihadists 
from entering J&K from Pakistan. Their tasks also involved protection of Indian lines of 
communication from insurgent sabotage along with providing additional combat capability 
to resist massive uprisings should they occur.90  
As this massive troop buildup occurred in Kashmir, Pakistan grew weary of the 
India Army’s robust force package so near its border. Pakistan had conducted a massive, 
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joint air-land training exercise called Zarb-i-Momin within Punjab in December 1989, the 
largest in the nation’s history. Following completion of this exercise, Pakistan did not 
redeploy its forces to home station, retaining an offensive posture. Furthermore, the focus 
of this exercise was offensive in nature, rehearsing a combined arms thrust into India with 
fully integrated air support. The nature, size, scope, and proximity of this exercise, coupled 
with Pakistan’s continued mobilization, raised tensions into April 1990.91 
India, skeptical of this massive training exercise and its lack of demobilization 
within proximity to Kashmir aroused suspicion by the spring of 1990. As insurgent 
violence continued to escalate within J&K, some Indian analysts were convinced that 
Pakistan was waiting for the right conditions to launch a conventional attack. They 
reasoned that Pakistan would assume Indian forces in Kashmir would be tied up 
suppressing militants and would be overwhelmed by a swift campaign.92 India also 
estimated that Pakistan would wait until early summer 1990 as the monsoons subsided, 
providing optimal conditions for maneuver warfare and allowing time for continued 
degradation of the security situation by insurgents.93 India responded with a mobilization 
of two armored divisions numbering 100,000 troops to a shooting range in Rajasthan, 
fueling tensions of an Indian pre-emptive and preventative attack. By April 1990, 200,000 
Indian troops had deployed in total to J&K, while approximately 100,000 Pakistan soldiers 
stood on the opposite side of the LoC. Each adversary feared preemptive strikes from each 
other.94 
Massive conventional mobilization was coupled with escalatory rhetoric from both 
Pakistani and Indian leaders. Although vitriolic commentary between the new nations had 
been common through the decades regarding Kashmir, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto raised tensions in March of 1990. During a visit to the Pakistan portion of Kashmir, 
she avowed Pakistan’s support of Kashmir independence and the work of “freedom 
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fighters” within the insurgency. Most provocatively, she emphasized that Pakistan was 
prepared to fight an “one thousand year war” against Indian rule. Indian Prime Minister 
V.P. Singh retorted in April that “[Pakistan] should examine whether they will last a 
thousand hours of war.”95 This emphasized India’s willingness to decisively defeat 
Pakistan over the Kashmir problem. 
By April, the United States became increasingly concerned with the spike in 
Kashmir violence, conventional military buildup, and provocative words by each country’s 
leadership. Most worrisome, was the state of de facto nuclear weapons capability and 
posture of India and Pakistan. Most experts agreed that each country had a nuclear weapon, 
or was capable of employing a deliverable weapon within a few days or weeks. In addition, 
varying assessments from U.S. diplomatic, military and intelligence relationships 
demonstrated a dynamic environment with no clear picture. In Perception, Politics and 
Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis Of 1990, the authors demonstrate the 
nebulous nature of this crisis and the context of U.S intervention: 
Apparently, differing assessments of the crisis had reached President Bush 
by May. The U.S. ambassadors in New Delhi and Islamabad were already 
deeply involved in the process of crisis management through their 
independent assessment of military positions and their reassurances to the 
respective governments. They also believed that hostilities were not 
imminent, although there was a risk of war later in the year. The Department 
of State was slightly more concerned, with the CIA holding the most 
alarmist position, seeing the possibility of a conflict that might acquire 
nuclear overtones. Still, even the most pessimistic view held that the 
prospects of a conflict were in the 20 percent range. It was the potential for 
the use of nuclear weapons that energized the U.S.96  
The corresponding U.S. intervention, led by Deputy National Security Advisor 
Robert Gates sought to deescalate the situation by first ensuring Pakistan and India 
demobilize their offensive forces to prevent an accidental escalatory event or 
miscalculation. In May 1990, Gates met with the Islamabad and New Delhi governments, 
arguing for immediate de-escalation of conventional forces. With respect to Pakistan, he 
 
95 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 41. 
96 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia, 100. 
33 
emphasized India’s sheer conventional dominance and Pakistan’s highly probable defeat 
against these odds. With India, he argued that although victory was likely, the costs of the 
war would be far too great to justify its action. Gates emphasized that Pakistan’s capability 
to go nuclear in order to mitigate its conventional disadvantage specifically changed India’s 
risk calculus.97  
Following the Gates visit, the 1990 Kashmir crisis quickly deescalated. Within two 
weeks, India had demobilized its armor forces from the Marajan Range and Pakistan 
followed suit by returning its forces postured near the LoC to their home stations. By June, 
the international crisis had subsided, but violence continued to thrive within Kashmir for 
the next decade.98  
D. ANALYZING THE 1990 KASHMIR CRISIS  
Applying the stability/instability paradox to the 1990 Kashmir crisis provides a 
framework to analyze the relationship between Pakistan’s latent nuclear capability with its 
employment of irregular forces, coupled with the overall stability of the entire region. The 
stability/instability paradox states that nuclear powers are likely to not fight direct wars 
against each other for fear of nuclear retaliation, but will resort in limited war on a broader 
scale. Thus, the likelihood of nuclear war decreases as the likelihood of limited, indirect 
conflict increases.99 The 1990 Kashmir crisis offers two interesting takeaways. First, the 
regional crisis compelled third party intervention to immediately quell the threat of nuclear 
exchange providing a level of stability at the diplomatic level. The threat of nuclear 
escalation, the likelihood debated by scholars and practitioners from marginal to very 
likely, seemed irrelevant. The U.S. intervened simply because the capability did exist.100 
Thus, leveraging global powers to de-escalate an immediate crisis provided a vital 
deescalating lever.  
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Second, the de-escalation of the crisis only occurred with respect to the Pakistan-
India direct confrontation, while not deescalating the underlying Kashmir crisis itself. In 
fact, the Pakistan-supported Kashmiri insurgency continued to increase in its intensity 
during the greater part of the decade. Thus, Pakistan had identified operational space at the 
irregular warfare level to serve its interests in the region over a protracted timeline. 
1. Nuclear Component Analyzed 
Pakistan had achieved some level of nuclear capability by the late 1980s. Analysts 
differed on the level of nuclear latency, but the intelligence community agreed that Pakistan 
was capable of nuclear breakout within a few weeks at most. In addition, positive rhetoric 
with respect to its nuclear capability by Muhammed Zia in the late 1980s provided 
additional reinforcement of Pakistan’s realization that this capability was credible and 
capable of changing the risk calculus in the region.101 
With respect to a regional nuclear conflict, intervention of a foreign power is a 
significant aspect that involves consideration in the Kashmir situation. As global powers 
attempt to influence the international order to their advantage, an uncontrolled regional 
dispute that could devolve into a conventional or nuclear conflict presents a problem whose 
results could have significant impacts with worldwide implications. The U.S. chose to 
intervene within this crisis as it administered the end of the Cold War. Robert Gates himself 
had travelled from Moscow to the region in order to deescalate the situation. Intelligence 
regarding the exact capability of nuclear weapons as well as their disposition were 
unknown at the time. However, the U.S. assessed that the situation could not be ignored, 
even at the smallest likelihood that a nuclear event would occur.102 Contrasted to the 1971 
Bangladesh War where India and Pakistan possessed only conventional military capability 
and the superpowers largely remained out of the hostilities, the nuclear aspect of this crisis 
reigns paramount. Vipin Narang’s Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era emphasis on 
Pakistan’s catalytic nuclear policy during this episode provides a unique perspective: 
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Pakistan had necessary capability—an ambiguous but credibly functional 
capability—and the availability of a third-party patron through at least 1990 
that enabled it to successfully implement a catalytic posture. The posture 
allowed Pakistan to more aggressively execute a long-standing revisionist 
preference to support insurgent groups—for example, in Punjab and 
Kashmir—with the probabilistic calculation that the United States would 
intercede to prevent significant Indian retaliation that might result in 
escalation to the nuclear level.103  
He emphasized Pakistan’s leverage of the U.S.’s relationship in this instance as its Cold 
War client against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to bring stability to the crisis as a key 
component of its approach to Kashmir. Pakistan’s fledgling nuclear capability had not been 
tested, and therefore could not be validated. In addition, it possessed a primitive launch 
capability likely having to rely on aerial delivery systems. However, evidence suggested 
that Pakistan signaled to the U.S. its heightened nuclear status instead of India in order to 
garner intervention from its Cold War ally. The U.S. had an additional incentive to avoid 
a nuclear confrontation with India, as that would remove focus from its efforts to leverage 
Pakistan in shaping the post-Soviet environment in Afghanistan.104  
Seymour Hersch’s Washington Post article laid claim that National Security 
Agency signals intercepts prompted the rapid intervention by Robert Gates in April 1990, 
thus beginning the de-escalation.105 Although it is important to note that the details of 
Hersch’s article have been largely debated, it cannot be denied that the U.S. intervened 
quickly and purposely.106 In this manner, the threat however imminent and credible, was 
deemed worthy of immediate U.S. intervention. Therefore, it seems that a level of the 
nuclear stability within the context of the 1990 Kashmir crisis resided in the international 
community’s willingness to become involved with regional disputes if there was a chance 
that the nuclear taboo is broken. Consequently, within this unique nuclear regional conflict, 
it appeared that foreign intervention to deescalate the situation provided a level of stability 
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not otherwise present between prospective belligerents, such as the U.S. and Soviet Union 
during the Cold War.  
2. Irregular Warfare Analyzed 
The 1990 Kashmir crisis revealed that irregular warfare was capable of escalating 
to the highest levels of conflict and risk nuclear confrontation. The rising tension and 
eventual violent breakout of Kashmiri separatists did give rise to enhanced tensions at the 
conventional military, diplomatic, and potentially nuclear level. This refutes the concept 
that limited conflict would be the “escape valve” for nuclear powers to avoid escalation as 
prescribed in the context of the stability/instability paradox. This demonstrates a direct 
connection between the irregular warriors within the region, Pakistan’s revisionist ideals, 
and India’s unwillingness to rescind control of the region. 
Pakistan’s direct support of the increasingly violent Kashmir insurgency allowed 
this regional dispute to accelerate into a larger crisis. Because of the two wars fought to 
this point over the region, India was aware of Pakistan’s desire to wrest control of J&K, 
and to do so without risking a conventional war they were incapable of winning. Therefore, 
Indian could escalate its conventional advantage as a mitigating factor by signaling its 
willingness to punish Pakistan in a larger scale, beyond the border of J&K into its sovereign 
territory. India signaled this through its Marajan armor exercises as a supplementation to 
the hundreds of thousands of troops already emplaced in Kashmir to quell the 
insurgency.107 As in the Bangladesh War, India executed this approach on West Pakistan, 
with horrible results for Pakistan. Therefore, during the specific 1990 Kashmir crisis, 
nuclear capability did not ensure stability at the level of limited warfare. 
Where the instability/stability paradox can be successfully applied was 
immediately following the crisis’s de-escalation. Following the 1990 Kashmir crisis, the 
violence in Kashmir continued to increase throughout the decade. The evidence indicates 
that the specific ‘conventional’ crisis had cooled in May 1990, irregular warfare continued 
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at increasing rates within Kashmir.108As discussed, the conventional escalation by both 
belligerents did result in a degree of nuclear posturing that sparked international interest 
and eventual de-escalation. However, for the next decade, violence within Kashmir 
continued to increase.109 Figure 1 displays this dynamic. One can see that violent deaths 
due to the insurgency increased sharply in the years directly following the 1990 Kashmir 
crisis before leveling off at over 2500 fatalities per year.110 This demonstrates a much more 
violent reality than the decades prior, when Pakistan was merely in pursuit of nuclear 
capability. 
 
Figure 1. Total Fatalities Due To Insurgency in Indian-Administered Jammu 
and Kashmir by Year111 
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Therefore, although the nuclear aspect of the 1990 Kashmir crisis was deescalated 
at  the nuclear level, the regional conflict developed into a state of “new normal” violence. 
Here, it seems that Pakistan had identified operational space to continue its protracted 
revisionist campaign. Although India was still willing to invest a great deal of military 
capability to maintain its authority and unwilling to submit to separatist demands of 
independence, it did not seek to leverage its conventional advantage to intimidate or coerce 
Pakistan again until the Kargil War of 1999.112 
E. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan was partially successful in leveraging its emerging nuclear deterrence 
capability with its revisionist irregular warfare approach in Kashmir in 1990. Although it 
was not able to overthrow the India-backed government through unconventional means, it 
did create an environment of prolonged instability that absorbed Indian counterinsurgency 
resources while avoiding another escalatory event for almost a decade. Pakistan was also 
able to leverage intervention by its Cold War ally, the U.S., by signaling the threat of 
nuclear escalation to entice support in the crisis. In the end, Pakistan’s revisionist efforts 
remained intact and it had avoided a larger conflict with India. 
As the Cold War gave way to U.S. supremacy, Pakistan lost a close ally in the 
United States. The U.S.’s divestment from Afghanistan coupled with its desire to again 
counter Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation with the enforcement of the Pressler Amendment 
in 1991 largely ended the U.S.-Pakistan partnership.113 Pakistan then sought to increase 
its nuclear delivery capability in parity with India, while also remaining a de facto nuclear 
power. This status changed in 1998 when India overtly signaled its nuclear weapons 
capability with a successful nuclear weapons test and Pakistan subsequently following suit. 
The next chapter identifies Pakistan’s employment of irregular forces with its newly 
acquired overt nuclear status during the 1999 Kargil War. 
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IV. 1998 NUCLEAR TEST AND THE KARGIL WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In May 1999, Indian soldiers confirmed suspicions that Pakistan troops had seized 
multiple mountain positions in the Kargil region of J&K. The resultant three-month war 
was the first conflict between the two adversaries since 1971 and occurred only a year since 
both nations demonstrated their nuclear capability to the world. Pakistan’s use of irregular 
troops to aggressively seize terrain within J&K devolved into a dangerous crisis that risked 
nuclear escalation and garnered international admonishment.114  
This case study describes the events leading to the Kargil War, the Kargil War 
itself, and war termination. It then analyzes how the employment of irregular forces by 
Pakistan to wrest control of a portion of J&K was connected to its newly acquired overt 
nuclear parity with India. From this analysis, the report demonstrates the capabilities and 
limitations of irregular forces with respect to the stability/instability paradox and Pakistan’s 
failure to connect its tactical gains with ultimate strategic success. 
B. PRELUDE TO THE KARGIL WAR 
Recent changes to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons posture and the overall nuclear 
dynamic vis-à-vis India set the stage for the Kargil War. Between May 11 and 13, 1998, 
India conducted five live tests of nuclear weapons. India’s stated reasoning for its overt 
nuclear signaling was that it served as a deterrence measure against the revisionist ideals 
of China and Pakistan on the subcontinent. The results of the tests positioned Pakistan to 
reestablish deterrence by mirroring India’s overt nuclear posture.115 Pakistan quickly 
followed suit when it reportedly exploded six nuclear devices three weeks later. These tests 
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propelled the regional rivals from a de facto, unofficial nuclear status into the fraternity of 
established nuclear powers.116  
Concerning to the international community was Pakistan’s additional efforts to 
establish nuclear deterrence against the proven superiority of its conventionally dominant 
foe. In order to mitigate this disadvantage, Pakistan adopted what Vipin Narang coined as 
an “asymmetric escalation” posture that established the threat of first-use of nuclear 
weapons against Indian conventional build up and aggression against Pakistan. Narang also 
notes that this posture directly confronts the adversary instead of compelling the 
intervention of a third party: 
Asymmetric escalation postures are aimed at deterring both conventional 
and nuclear conflict against the state. Unlike the catalytic posture in which 
the use of nuclear weapons is only contemplated in the face of a significant 
conventional threat to a state and whose signal is directed toward a third-
party patron, an asymmetric escalation posture attempts to directly deter 
conventional conflict by another nuclear or non-nuclear state in toto by 
threatening the first use of nuclear weapons in either a tactical or strategic 
strike. The deterrent threat is clearly communicated to the adversary in 
question, not a third-party patron. While the third party may still have 
incentives to cap escalation, the primary goal of the posture is no longer to 
compel that patron’s intervention but rather to directly deter an 
opponent.117 
Pakistan accomplished this enhanced posture through complete integration of its nuclear 
capability within its military forces. By ensuring that military doctrine encompassed the 
employment of nuclear weapons should India threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity with 
either nuclear or conventional weapons, it enhanced the credibility of its deterrence threat 
beyond the mere overt possession of nuclear weapons.118 This threat was deemed even 
more credible through Pakistan’s known ability to deliver aerial munitions from fighter 
aircraft by this time.119  
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International condemnation of these nuclear tests was swift and severe. United 
States President Bill Clinton quickly condemned them and the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) also responded hastily by passing Resolution 1172. This resolution officially 
admonished both nations’ nuclear tests and outlined conditions that must be met to limit 
nuclear proliferation and escalation. Resolution 1172 also acknowledged the Kashmir 
problem as a potential nuclear flashpoint between India and Pakistan, and urged efforts 
between the nations to encourage peace. For Pakistan, this was significant as it was the first 
UN acknowledgement of the Kashmir problem as a strategic impasse since the Second 
Kashmir War of 1965.120 This potentially provided Pakistan an angle to leverage its overt 
nuclear capability and achieve revision in the region with support of the international 
community. 
In response to international pressure and an effort to normalize relationships, Indian 
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee met Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 
Lahore, Pakistan in February 1999. The meeting held symbolic significance as it 
represented a concerted effort to initiate reforms in the midst of the changing nuclear 
dynamics between the historic adversaries. The resulting Lahore Declaration illustrated 
confidence building measures to reduce the nuclear postures between the nations and 
resolve the Kashmir dispute peacefully.121 However, Pakistan’s attempt to militarily seize 
the Kargil heights and the corresponding war in May 1999 erased these measures, led to 
war, and compromised future diplomatic endeavors. 
As nuclear postures on the Indian subcontinent changed in the late 1990s, so did 
the dynamics of the Pakistan-supported Kashmir insurgency. To Pakistan’s dismay, India 
had begun restoring greater law and order to the region while reestablishing political 
influence. India had successfully reformed its counterinsurgency practices which included 
less lethal and draconian methods when interacting with Kashmiri resistance forces and 
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civilians. In addition, the counter-insurgents employed a more robust intelligence network 
that helped destabilize the insurgent networks and disrupt them from within.122  
Pakistan also increasingly relied on foreign jihadists to conduct irregular warfare in 
Kashmir which proved to alienate the traditionally supportive Kashmiri population. The 
ISI became exceedingly frustrated with the JKLF’s willingness to negotiate with the Indian 
government over issues within Kashmir that were not directly aligned with Pakistani 
revisionism. The ISI therefore relied on non-native mujahedeen that strictly aligned with 
Pakistan’s interest in accession of J&K and were more willing to conduct extreme acts of 
violence. Most notably, Pakistan employed the terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) to maintain violence in J&K. These groups would eventually 
expand their efforts beyond Kashmir into mainland India.123 However, this reliance on 
“foreign jihadists” alienated the Kashmiri population as indigenous support of Pakistani’s 
proxy war began to wane. As Ganguly and Hagerty describes in Fearful Symmetry, “unlike 
the home-grown JKLF, many of these latter-day entrants into the Kashmiri fray had few, 
if any, blood-soil ties to Kashmir. Consequently, they exhibited scant scruples with their 
harsh dealings with the local population.”124 Within this context, the Indian security forces 
were able to gain an advantage by exploiting the growing schism between insurgents and 
the population. 
India exploited the growing animosity within the insurgent networks and with the 
population by conducting Kashmiri Parliamentary elections in September 1996 that were 
widely considered free and fair. This was a significant step forward in the peaceful 
transition of power as contrasted to elections earlier that year. These elections resulted in 
the National Assembly Party winning a majority of seats in the state assembly, and instilled 
cautious hope for sustained peace amongst Kashmiris.125 With the trend toward peace by 
1998 in Kashmir, members in the Pakistan military feared that the ‘noble cause’ had 
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dampened along with international visibility on the conflict. In addition, many believed 
that Pakistan’s ability to wage proxy war in Kashmir was a strategic fight that compelled 
India to commit hundreds of thousands of troops that could otherwise be used to threaten 
Pakistan’s sovereignty.126 
C. KARGIL WAR 
The war originated from Pakistan’s attempt to wrest control of Indian redoubts and 
fighting positions in the mountains surrounding the town of Kargil in J&K, approximately 
seven kilometers from the LoC. These positions were occupied seasonally by Indian forces 
and vacated during the winter due to the harsh Himalayan climate. The heights provided 
strategic control of India’s National Highway 1 that connected Srinagar to Indian forces 
based on the Siachen Glacier. Control of this highway would therefore isolate Indian forces 
and provide Pakistan control of highly defendable positions within J&K.127 
Planning for this operation was based upon two critical assumptions. First, Pakistan 
could capitalize upon its overt nuclear deterrence status with India to make revisionist gains 
within Kashmir. By conducting a bold maneuver to occupy the peaks surround Srinagar, 
India would not choose to escalate the conflict and accept Pakistan’s gains. India would do 
this to avoid escalating the event into a major war and corresponding nuclear standoff.128 
Second, the international community, specifically the U.S., would react swiftly and urge a 
brokered deal to prevent escalation. The international community had proven 
hypersensitive to the overt nuclearization of the Indian subcontinent, and understood the 
Kashmir problem as a flash point for uncontrolled escalation. Therefore, a fait accompli 
could result in a U.S.-backed peace deal that would work in Pakistan’s favor. Both 
assumptions proved faulty.129  
 
126 John H. Gil, “Provocation, War and Restraint Under the Nuclear Shadow: The Kargil Conflict 
1999,” Journal of Strategic Studies: War & Peace in Contemporary India, Edited by Rudra Chaudhuri 42, 
no. 5 (July 29, 2019): 704. 
127 Gil, “Provocation, War and Restraint Under the Nuclear Shadow: The Kargil Conflict 1999,” 702. 
128 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 51. 
129 Meyrle, Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: A Brief History, 13. 
44 
The operation, directly planned and approved by Army Chief of Staff General 
Pervez Musharraf and potentially unknown to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, involved the 
infiltration of four battalions of Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry sent to occupy the 
mountain positions surrounding Kargil between December 1998 and April 1999. These 
forces wore civilian clothes, posing as Kashmiri militants to affect deniability and protect 
Pakistan’s direct involvement.130 In addition, Pakistan also employed the LeT militants 
alongside its infantry during this operation.131 This was a significant escalation within 
Pakistan’s irregular warfare campaign as it is the first time that Pakistan directly used its 
military to breech the LoC on an offensive operation within Kashmir. The Indian Army did 
not become aware of Pakistan’s operation until May 6, when one of its patrols was 
ambushed while conducting a reconnaissance of the area following reports of militant 
operations in the region. By late May, India had assessed that as many as 800 Pakistani 
militants had breached the LoC and occupied around 70 defensive positions in the 
mountains around Kargil.132 
India initially responded with infantry forces that were unable to wrest the well 
defended Pakistani forces from their advantageous positions. However, India quickly 
escalated its military response through joint employment of its army, air force, and naval 
assets. It diverted the Indian 15th and 16th Corps from counterinsurgency assignments 
within J&K to dislodge the Pakistani forces; along with re-tasking the 6th Mountain 
Division from duty on the Chinese border to the region. India further escalated its 
conventional military response with tenacious air to ground attacks meant to degrade the 
defensive positions and facilitate Indian forces as they assaulted up steep terrain to retake 
positions upward of 14,000 feet.133 
By late June, India’s relentless air campaign and corresponding ground assaults 
eroded Pakistan’s advantage. Indian forces had also done so without crossing the LoC, 
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even as it would have enjoyed a marked tactical advantage during its operations in 
Kargil.134 This disciplined choice may have negatively affected Indian forces on the 
battlefield, but provided political leverage as it demonstrated India’s calculated and 
nuanced approach to the conflict with a desire to avoid an escalatory event.  
For Pakistan, the operation was turning into an operational and strategic disaster. 
The Pakistan government maintained deniability throughout the crisis, asserting the 
infiltration was the work of Islamic militants and not the Pakistani Army. In addition, the 
Prime Minister argued that the Kargil War was a function of the larger Kashmir problem 
and required international intervention. The U.S. categorially rejected both assertions, 
refused to broker a negotiated deal between belligerents, and called for the immediate 
withdrawal of Pakistan’s forces from J&K.135 Prime Minister’s Shariff’s visit to the White 
House in July solidified Pakistan’s defeat as President Clinton affirmed an unwillingness 
to intervene without Pakistan’s complete withdrawal from Kargil and acknowledgement of 
the LoC. By late July, Pakistan had retrograded from all positions within J&K and the 
hostilities ended, with almost 500 Indians and over 700 Pakistanis killed in the conflict.136  
The nuclear component of the Kargil War remains nebulous. Pakistani officials did 
make insinuations regarding nuclear weapons during the crisis, such as the Foreign 
Secretary Shamshad Ahmad stating that Pakistan “will not hesitate to use any weapon in 
our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity.”137 In addition, U.S. and Indian intelligence 
agencies had determined that the Pakistan military assumed an increasingly aggressive 
posture with its nuclear missiles. India responded directly with similar preparations.138 
However, during his summit with President Clinton, Prime Minister Sharif appeared 
surprised and denied the accusation when the intelligence was presented to him of 
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aggressive nuclear posturing.139 However, questions remain concerning the purpose of this 
signaling or if Prime Minister Sharif even possessed knowledge of the Pakistan military’s 
control over its nuclear arsenal whatsoever. Nuclear proliferation expert Scott Sagan in 
Nuclear South Asia sums up the importance of Pakistan’s nuclear ambiguity and disconnect 
between its civil and military leadership by stating: 
The mysterious operations in Pakistan were exceedingly important for they 
led to Kargil being South Asia’s first confirmed nuclear crisis, and not just 
a conventional war, as the Indian military responded to ambiguous Pakistan 
nuclear activities with missile-alert and deployment operations of their 
own.140  
Sagan’s comments emphasized the ambiguous nature of the nuclear component of this 
crisis just one year after each country demonstrated nuclear capability. In addition, it 
demonstrated the connection between Pakistan’s perceived freedom of maneuver under the 
nuclear umbrella with irregular troops, its corresponding miscalculation during the Kargil 
War, and the effects of its ill-defined nuclear posture in the midst of an ongoing conflict. 
D. ANALYSIS 
This episode demonstrated the complexities of overt nuclear capability beyond 
simple deterrence through the possession of nuclear weapons as well as the limitations of 
irregular warfare within the framework of the stability/instability paradox. Pakistan wanted 
to capitalize upon its newly formed overt nuclear deterrence with India—and the 
corresponding international attention—by seizing terrain within J&K without consequence. 
It is reasonable to assert that the international community would not want to risk any sort 
of escalation, especially involving developing and fledgling regional powers new to the 
“nuclear club” and thus potentially more willing to assert their might. However, Pakistan 
overestimated its ability to exploit its nuclear posture through employment of irregular 
forces in Kashmir and underestimated international admonishment for its actions.141  
 
139 Khan, Eating Grass, 314. 
140 Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” 233. 
141 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 
123. 
47 
1. Irregular Warfare Approach 
Throughout the events of 1999, Pakistan lacked appreciation for the nuances 
associated with irregular warfare below the nuclear umbrella with respect to fostering 
international support and crisis resolution. Insurgency warfare within Kashmir was 
identified as potentially escalatory as it had resulted in several escalating events in the past: 
First and Second Kashmir Wars and the 1990 Kashmir crisis. However, outright attempting 
a fait accompli with Pakistan forces dressed in civilian clothes while attempting to maintain 
deniability across an internationally-recognized border did not maintain the idea of an 
“ongoing territorial dispute.”  This was viewed by India and the international community 
as diverting from the status quo and inherently escalatory. Furthermore, the infiltration of 
irregular forces by Pakistan occurred during ongoing diplomatic negotiations that 
precipitated the Lahore Agreements. This sense of ensuing peace reduced tensions and 
likely lowered India’s security posture and facilitated the infiltration.142 However, this 
tactical gain came at a strategic cost as it demonstrated Pakistan’s reckless approach to both 
its adversarial relationship with India and its responsibility as a nuclear power. 
Pakistan also did not envision India’s measured response, both operationally and 
strategically. Although the liberal use of Indian airpower to degrade Pakistan’s defensive 
positions could have been perceived as escalatory, because it was strictly focused on 
military targets against enemy positions within the Indian-administered area of Kashmir, it 
appeared to be a reasonable and justifiable defensive response. Similarly, India’s decision 
not to cross the LoC into Pakistan territory proved to support its stated objective of 
reestablishing the border, not merely a guise to acquire additional Pakistani territory.143 
Not only was this latter decision integral in maintaining a moral high ground within this 
specific conflict, it keenly identified a potential threshold for nuclear escalation. Although 
Pakistan maintained ambiguity concerning any nuclear red lines, conventional military 
advance into sovereign territory would have logically been perceived as escalatory. 
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Pakistan’s decision to use irregular Army troops instead of Islamic militants during 
the Kargil War had deleterious effects. First, by maintaining deniability, Pakistan could not 
support its ground force with air or artillery support without simultaneously destroying its 
position and escalating conventionally.144 Second, it placed Pakistan in position of overtly 
striking Indian forces within Indian-administered territory thereby forfeiting any 
international support as an escalating act of war. This would likely be viewed as 
extraordinarily irresponsible by the international community as unnecessarily increasing 
the likelihood of a larger conventional and potentially nuclear confrontation. 
The Kargil War also demonstrated the spectrum of warfare available beneath the 
nuclear umbrella as applied to the stability/instability paradox. India enjoyed the ability to 
conduct conventional, combined arms attacks within its sovereign territory where Pakistan 
did not share this advantage. Pakistan’s employment of irregular warfare during the Kargil 
War assumed that a certain level of violence was accepted as normal and appropriate within 
the context of ongoing struggle within Kashmir. However, as it became apparent that the 
Pakistan Army had seized numerous established Indian positions within its recognized 
territory, the dynamic shifted beyond insurgent violence and transcended into a state-
sponsored act of war. India, identifying this dynamic, responded to the issue while avoiding 
a troop build-up that could be perceived as threatening to Pakistan at large.145 This avoided 
potential Pakistani reprisal and maintained international support of India throughout the 
crisis.  
2. Nuclear Component 
Pakistan’s nuclear posture during Kargil proves difficult to ascertain as specific 
knowledge remains disputed and incomplete. However, U.S. and Indian intelligence 
services reportedly learned of Pakistan’s decentralization and deployment of nuclear 
weapons in some capacity during the crisis, a fact denied by Pakistani officials.146 Two 
possibilities are worth considering. First, Pakistan changed its posture in the event that the 
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Kargil War became a protracted, stalemated affair. This would allow Pakistan to deter 
India’s conventional escalation should it grow impatient and seek to escalate hostilities 
beyond the relatively small battlefield of Kargil. This would not be without its roots in 
history, as the actions of India during the Bangladesh War provided a stinging precedent 
for Pakistan’s leadership that informed their security decisions since 1971.147 Second, 
Pakistan could have signaled its nuclear posture in order to compel the international 
community to intervene as well as deter India’s decisive response. 
The first possibility accounts for Pakistan’s lack of options in support of its troops 
around Kargil. It could not reasonably utilize air support without risking a highly volatile 
conventional war. Outgunned and outmatched conventionally, highlighting its nuclear 
parity with India could provide it with enough leverage to drive negotiations or at least 
prevent wider hostilities. Especially considering that the fait accompli maneuver did not 
result in India’s compliance, Pakistan required an additional measure to salvage its position 
in the absence of operational contingencies.  
The second possibility could have been an effort to force quick and decisive 
negotiations by the U.S. to demand peace prior to the nuclear crisis spiraling out of control. 
In this view, perhaps the international community would support appeasement in order to 
avoid a crisis scenario altogether. However, India outright denied entertaining any action 
less than the re-establishment of the LoC. The U.S. did meet with the Pakistani Prime 
Minister and confronted him with the nuclear posturing reports, but did not seek bilateral 
peace talks. Instead, President Clinton demanded Pakistan’s return across the LoC and 
reestablish pre-Kargil War status quo conditions. Thus, nuclear weapons did not achieve 
Pakistan’s desired effect.148 
Nuclear optimists argue that nuclear weapons on the Indian subcontinent prevented 
the Kargil War from escalating into a larger conventional war. India understood its red 
lines and chose to mitigate the risk of escalation by maintaining its focus on the limited 
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objective of reestablishing the territorial integrity of the LoC.149 Pessimists argue that the 
Kargil War only happened because Pakistan possessed overt nuclear weapons and 
therefore had the perceived capacity to aggressively revise the situation in Kashmir, 
compared to its proxy warfare insurgent approach of decades past.150 While both 
arguments demonstrate the capabilities of potentially empowering irregular warfare and 
limiting the protraction of the corresponding military response, one must also understand 
the interaction between irregular warfare and nuclear capability within the context of 
deterrence and the instability/stability paradox. The Kargil War demonstrates that although 
there is substantial freedom of maneuver for conventional forces when reacting to an 
irregular threat under the nuclear umbrella, there are also substantial drawbacks as well. In 
addition, specifically for regional powers, there is a powerful component of international 
opinion and intervention that can drive success or failure in this context. As witnessed with 
Pakistan, it was unable to tie initial tactical success with strategic victory and alienated the 
international community in the process.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The Kargil War was an outright loss for Pakistan. Although it achieved tactical 
success while infiltrating its forces, the fait accompli devolved into strategic failure. 
Pakistan’s efforts were perceived as irresponsible and an unnecessarily violent effort that 
could have instigated nuclear escalation. Conversely, India’s measured and controlled 
response was lauded by the international community for its focus and concern for 
unnecessary nuclear escalation. Pakistan’s failure demonstrated the complexities of 
irregular warfare employment under an overt nuclear umbrella.  
This episode represents the direct interaction between Pakistan’s nuclear capability 
and it’s irregular warfare approach. Pakistan escalated the Kashmir conflict by employing 
Pakistani soldiers directly into hostilities vice supporting proxy Islamic militants in 
Kashmir. This attempt to maintain deniability limited flexible options, damaged Pakistan’s 
reputation, and crippled any chances for a positive outcome to the conflict. 
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V. PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION AND THE 2019 
PULWAMA CRISIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On February 14, 2019, 40 Indian soldiers were killed by an Islamic suicide bomber 
loyal to the Pakistan-based militant group JeM within the Pulwama district of J&K. The 
ensuing crisis involved an exchange of airstrikes for the first time since the 1971 
Bangladesh War and first significant kinetic altercation between these adversaries since the 
Kargil War of 1999.151 This crisis also occurred over two decades from each adversary’s 
demonstration of nuclear capability. Subsequently, Pakistan developed an advanced and 
multi-dimensional nuclear program capable of land, sea, and air based nuclear response 
that is supplemented with a tactical nuclear capability.152 
This case study analyzes and describes the events leading to the Pulwama crisis, 
the Pulwama crisis itself, and its aftermath while highlighting Pakistan’s nuclear capability 
and irregular warfare employment. The dynamics of irregular warfare within J&K are then 
investigated within the environment of Pakistan’s advanced nuclear capability, specifically 
Pakistan’s diverse nuclear military apparatus and its tactical nuclear weapons. This case 
study also considers India’s apparent willingness to escalate to conventional warfare in 
response to terrorist violence inside J&K and the repercussions of a changing status quo 
within the region. Finally, the U.S.’s role within the crisis is considered as it pertains to its 
competition with China. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The two decades of J&K insurgency leading up to the Pulwama crisis contrasted 
remarkably with the Kashmir resistance movement originating in the 1980s. Pakistan-
based jihadist organizations supplanted the grassroots Kashmiri insurgency that had 
defined the struggle for J&K independence from India. With support of the ISI, LeT and 
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JeM became the new face of the insurgency and demonstrated a willingness to expand 
operations beyond J&K into the Indian homeland. Although these Pakistan-based groups 
shifted the narrative of a Kashmiri grassroots insurgency for freedom into an ideological 
conflict, Pakistan was willing to accept this tradeoff. LeT and JeM were aligned with the 
state’s overall strategic objective of secession of J&K into Pakistan whereas J&K-based 
groups generally only desired independence. In addition, LeT and JeM demonstrated a 
greater threshold of violence and did not share the same fear of domestic reprisals as the 
local insurgents. This resulted in continued violence against Indian security forces 
operating inside of J&K that protracted into India. The high profile attacks against India’s 
Parliament in New Delhi in 2001 and the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 illustrated the 
changing dynamic of Pakistan-based irregular warfare.153 
As Pakistan’s irregular warfare approach in J&K evolved, India struggled to 
achieve a proportional response or deterrence strategy. India attempted diplomatic pressure 
against Pakistan to reign in the LeT and JeM following the New Delhi and Mumbai attacks, 
but achieved little success. Pakistan’s President Musharraf publicly decried the events, 
stating that Pakistan would not allow terrorists to carry out attacks from its soil and 
prohibited the LeT and JeM from operating within its borders. In reality, the ISI shielded 
LeT and JeM members from prosecution and likely enabled further operations. Pakistan’s 
ambivalence was most obviously displayed following the Mumbai attacks. Pakistan 
initially denied LeT involvement, eventually acknowledged the LeT’s responsibility and 
ties to its government, but refused to take decisive action against the group.154  
India’s inability to leverage its conventional military dominance to deter terrorism 
from Pakistani-based groups became an existential concern for India. The military 
standoffs following the New Delhi and Mumbai attacks resulted in posturing and little else, 
leaving feelings of political failure within India; while Pakistan enjoyed success with its 
long-term irregular warfare approach under the nuclear umbrella. With increasing political 
pressure to secure the homeland and deter Pakistani-based terrorism, India’s military 
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establishment developed a potentially proportional solution to the irregular warfare threat 
that could also be employed below the threshold of nuclear use.155 
This approach, known as Cold Start, re-oriented India away from its historic focus 
on overwhelming attacks deep within Pakistan for rapid and overwhelming maneuver 
against Pakistan forces proximal to the shared border, but not threatening to any of 
Pakistan’s strategic assets. The plan required India to quickly mobilize, deploy, and 
decimate Pakistan forces prior to dissuasion from the international community and in a 
manner that would not empower Pakistan to employ its nuclear arsenal.156  
The Cold Start doctrine, although never officially adopted by India, presented a 
shift in India’s operational approach toward Pakistan. In the face of India’s evolving Cold 
Start doctrine and Pakistan’s historic conventional military disadvantage, Pakistan invested 
substantially in the development of a robust nuclear weapons program capable of deterring, 
withstanding, and halting a limited conventional Indian offensive during the first two 
decades of the 21st century.157 Pakistan reasoned a nuclear triad modeled after that of the 
United States Cold War doctrine would be most suitable to reestablish credible deterrence. 
This resulted in the development of advanced aerial delivery systems for F-16 and Mirage 
aircraft; various short, medium, and long rage ground-based missile systems; and an 
emerging sea-based delivery system recently tested in 2017.158  
Pakistan’s most credible deterrence threat against a limited Indian offensive was its 
employment of the short-range Nasr missile in 2011. The Nasr missile, with its modest 
effective range of 60 km, provided a tactical nuclear capability that was fully integrated 
into the conventional military order of battle and a direct response to India’s Cold Start.159 
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In India’s Counterforce Strategic Dilemma, Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang stated the 
importance of this system to deter any limited Indian cross-border transgressions: 
Pakistan’s manipulation of the threat of low-level nuclear use, something 
that it had hinted at since 1998, now included a dedicated battlefield 
capability. Satellite imagery strongly suggests that Nasr batteries are kept 
near the border, implying that the short-range missile is in fact a fielded 
system.160  
The fielding of the Nasr system represents Pakistan’s continued acknowledgment of its 
conventional military weakness with India and the importance of its nuclear capability to 
deter Indian attacks. In addition, the limited impact of tactical nuclear weapons against 
specific military targets in defense of Pakistan territory provided a more focused, realistic, 
and credible deterrence weapon. Posturing its nuclear force as minimum credible 
deterrence during the early 21st century, Pakistan has recently described its nuclear program 
as a “full spectrum deterrence capability” since the Nasr missile’s inception.161 This 
change signaled Pakistan’s desire to fully leverage its menu of nuclear weapons options—
tactical to strategic—to best prevent India’s encroachment within its borders and leverage 
proxies against them.  
Pakistan has coupled its diverse nuclear capability with ambiguous nuclear 
employment doctrine to further deter India. As there is no official Pakistani doctrine made 
public that outlines nuclear terms of use, debate remains amongst practitioners and 
academics regarding Pakistan’s employment criteria, specifically with reference to its 
tactical nuclear weapons. In Nuclear South Asia, Scott Sagan highlights this ambiguity by 
identifying contradictory claims within Pakistan’s military establishment as to whether 
Pakistan would engage in limited nuclear engagement or only as a weapon of last resort to 
defend the state’s existence.162 However, nuclear experts Scott Sagan, Sadia Tasleem, and 
Toby Dalton point to Pakistan’s emulation of the U.S.’s flexible response doctrine of the 
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Cold War and Pakistan’s likely employment of tactical nuclear weapons should deterrence 
of India’s conventional force fail.163 
Pakistan’s full spectrum nuclear capability and doctrinal ambiguity have frustrated 
India’s response to terrorism over the last 20 years, leaving a perception of a weak 
counterterrorism strategy and impotence against a nuclear-armed Pakistan proxy force 
campaign. However, the 2019 crisis represents a remarkably more assertive Indian 
response and escalatory behavior contrasted against the episodic crises between these 
nations over the last two decades.  
C. THE CRISIS 
The 2019 Crisis began when a 22 year old Kashmiri man named Adil Ahmad Dar 
drove a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device into a bus filled with Indian 
paramilitary soldiers, detonated the device, and killing himself along with 44 others on 
February 14  in the Pulwama district of J&K.164 According to family reports, Adil Ahmad 
Dar had been radicalized following two episodes of public humiliation at the hands of 
Indian security forces in 2016. Adil would later pledge allegiance to JeM in March 2018, 
shortly before disappearing to join the group. During his absence, Adil likely received 
further indoctrination and training to prepare him for his February 14th operation.165  
This terrorist attack was reportedly the single deadliest event within J&K in the 30 
year history of its modern insurgency. Jaish-e-Mohammed quickly took credit for the attack 
and India hastily blamed Pakistan for supporting this operation. Indian Union Home 
Minister Rajnath Singh specifically implicated Pakistan’s ISI in the attack, accusing the 
agency of coordinating JeM activities to wrest control of J&K away from Indian security 
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forces.166 Within 24 hours, Indian Prime Minister Nedehra Modi unequivocally blamed 
Pakistan, stating the attacks would be met with a “crushing response” and that “our 
neighboring country thinks such terror attacks can weaken us, but their plans will not 
materialize.” 167  
Pakistan quickly denied responsibility for the attacks, accusing Prime Minister 
Modi of attempting to leverage the attacks for political support in the midst of his re-
election campaign. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Ihram Khan acknowledged the terrorist 
attack, likening it to a larger regional problem that required multinational cooperation. 
Khan qualified these remarks by warning against an Indian military response to the terrorist 
attack by saying, “If you think you would launch any attack on Pakistan and we would not 
think of retaliating, Pakistan will retaliate. Pakistan would not have any other choice but to 
give an answer.”168  
The situation further escalated on February 26, when Indian warplanes bombed a 
reported JeM training camp near Balakot, within sovereign Pakistan. In a statement 
following the attacks, the Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Keshav Gokhale characterized 
the operation as a pre-emptive measure against “non-military” terrorist targets based on 
actionable intelligence of an upcoming JeM operation. The statement further implicated 
Pakistan’s persistent inability and unwillingness to eradicate JeM as justification for the 
strikes.169 This event was of great significance as it represented the first instance in which 
India had bombed sovereign Pakistani territory since the 1971 Bangladesh War, when 
neither country possessed nuclear weapons. Damage assessments of the airstrikes were 
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unclear, with India claiming successful destruction of the camp and Pakistan stating the 
bombs were ineffectual.170 
Pakistan quickly responded with its own airstrikes within J&K on February 27, 
escalating tensions, and further defying the near-50 year old precedent. Pakistan justified 
these actions by emphasizing its defensive need to respond to India’s response by stating, 
“The Pakistan army and air force had no option to respond after India’s incursion.” Further 
statements emphasized Pakistan’s desire for peace, but need to demonstrate military 
capability to retaliate in the face of Indian aggression. They emphasized the ability to 
engage Indian military positions, but instead chose to destroy dirt instead.171 Presumably 
this show of force was meant to signal Pakistan’s strength, but desire to deescalate. Prime 
Minister Khan also sought intervention from the international community to diffuse further 
activities that could result in escalation: 
The international community also has a responsibility. In the current 
situation, Pakistan does not want to move towards war. From us, there is a 
message of peace. They [international community] must also come forward 
and see how the environment between Pakistan and India is a threat to peace 
and development, not just between the two countries but in the region and 
beyond.172  
This quote, although not specifically annotating the nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and 
India, underscored the potential ramifications of further conventional military interactions 
between the adversaries. It also acknowledged the role international bargaining had played 
in the past to de-escalate tensions over Kashmir. 
During the ensuing aerial engagement on February 27, Indian aircraft pursued 
Pakistan fighters into Pakistani airspace. The resulting air battle downed one Indian aircraft 
and the pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, was taken into custody by 
Pakistani forces. On March 1, as a “peace gesture,” Prime Minister Khan ordered the 
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release of the pilot back to India.173 A day earlier, Prime Minister Khan had urged 
diplomatic de-escalation in the only public reference to the nuclear dynamic by saying: 
“History tells us that wars are full of miscalculation. My question is that given the weapons 
we have can we afford miscalculation. We should sit down and talk.”174 This appeal, 
coupled with the return of the downed pilot, deescalated hostilities between the adversaries. 
Although later reports indicated that hostile verbal altercations occurred between 
respective intelligence agencies included threats of launching missiles from India, and 
Pakistani officials retorting they were prepared to respond threefold. However, no open 
source information exists citing provocative nuclear signaling beyond words.175  
The U.S.’s role in crisis management following the February 14 attacks was less 
direct than past situations. Immediately after the incident, National Security Advisor John 
Bolton acknowledged India’s right to self-defense in a call to New Delhi. Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo waited until after India delivered its airstrikes to urge de-escalation, 
ostensibly providing diplomatic space for India to respond militarily. Although U.S. 
officials maintained contact throughout the event, there were no physical visits with 
Pakistani or Indian leadership as in past crises such as the decisive U.S. diplomatic 
interventions in the near-war of 1990 and the Kargil War in 1999.176 
Following the immediate crisis that rapidly deescalated in March, additional fallout 
occurred from the event. First, in an effort to address consistent JeM terrorist activity in 
the region, three permanent members (U.S., United Kingdom, and France) of the UNSC 
attempted to designate JeM’s leader Masood Azhar as a global terrorist. This was the fourth 
attempt by the UNSC to take such action since 2009. Just as in the past three attempts, 
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China utilized its position on the UNSC to block the resolution, signaling its partnership in 
support of Pakistan in the midst of its $60 billion Belt and Road Initiative investment within 
the country. Interestingly, China reversed its decision against Masood Azhar on May 1, but 
few tangible results have ensured punishment of Azhar.177 This issue has further strained 
Indian and Chinese relations, representing a growing polarity as the U.S. draws closer to 
India and China to Pakistan.178  
Second, riding a renewed nationalist fervor following his assertive actions during 
the crisis, Modi was easily reelected as Prime Minister. Compared to India’s less decisive 
responses and perceived weakness following terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2008, Modi’s 
harsh rhetoric and military response leveraged strong support from within the country. 
Modi would then go on to win in a landslide victory in May, with timing and response of 
the attacks considered a proximal factor to his success at the polls.179  
Third, in August 2019 in the wake of his election, Modi capitalized on the 
nationalist movement to make sweeping reforms within J&K to draw the region closer to 
the Indian government. He revoked Article 370 of the Indian Constitution that stipulates 
special autonomy to J&K and integrates the historically independent state into India. Modi 
contested that Article 370 had impeded J&K’s development, aided the spread of terrorism, 
and alienated the population.180 In the months following the crisis, India also employed 
harsh media blackouts and curfews on the majority Muslim population to reportedly 
destabilize the J&K insurgency, further raising tensions with Pakistan over India’s 
treatment of Kashmiris.181  
The crisis ended with very little closure for either nation. Islamic terrorism 
continued to be a concern for India and Indian misrule over Muslims a leading frustration 
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for Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan and India may have entered a new era of instability 
regarding the J&K problem beneath the nuclear shadow with the Balakot airstrikes directly 
challenging the status quo.  
D. ANALYSIS 
1. Assessing the Regional Dynamic 
The Pulwama crisis represents a dangerous divergence from the status quo 
regarding the relationship between irregular warfare and nuclear escalation within J&K. 
The bomber, a young Kashmiri man who was radicalized by JeM after multiple negative 
interactions with Indian security forces epitomizes the persistent narrative within the 
ongoing Kashmir issue. Jaish-e-Mohammed continues to enjoy its relative safety within 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir along with access to a pool of disenfranchised youth within 
J&K; a source of fighters to perpetuate JeM’s revisionist goals. Pakistan’s unwillingness 
to fully address these terrorist threats within its own borders also remains a constant.182  
What has changed is the nature of Indian response to irregular warfare from 
Pakistan-based terrorist groups within J&K. The cross border airstrikes on reported JeM 
training camps cannot be overstated in their diversion from past crises. The Kargil War of 
1999 contained a massive Indian air campaign, but only against offensive Pakistani 
positions within J&K. India avoided strikes within Pakistan even though it would have 
likely provided a tactical advantage. The 2001 and 2008 terrorist attacks resulted in 
posturing and tough talk, development of Cold Start, but lacked a decisive response. 
Additionally, the aforementioned attacks were significantly more impactful than the 
Pulwama incident, taking place in India’s political and cultural capitals of New Delhi and 
Mumbai. Furthermore, the Balakot airstrikes occurred after Pakistan had developed a 
nuclear triad, to include a tactical nuclear capability. These facts point to a shifting dynamic 
of acceptable military response to irregular warfare in J&K. 
Prime Minister Modi’s choice to respond quickly and assertively was met with 
success at the polls months later. This near-immediate gratification for his decision has the 
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potential to inform an increasingly assertive approach in response to Pakistan-based 
terrorism within India’s borders. In contrast, Prime Minister Khan’s measured and 
diplomatic de-escalation of the crisis proved much more palatable for the international 
community. The return of the Indian pilot gave an outlet of diplomacy and created space 
for bi-lateral de-escalation which proved decisive in ending the military aspect of the crisis, 
at least in the near term.183  
The peaceful end to the Pulwama crisis belies the potential for catastrophic 
escalation for three reasons. First, Indian rhetoric coupled with airstrikes created a 
condition of battlefield uncertainty that risked rapid escalation with disastrous 
consequences. In this instance, India clearly delineated its attack against a target it deemed 
as a terrorist, non-military target within Pakistan-administered Kashmir that was not near 
the civilian population. The Indian’s foreign ministry’s response was concise in its 
justification for such attacks. However, Indian’s violation of Pakistan’s airspace with a 
substantial force package risks a plethora of negative, unintended outcomes inherent with 
direct, conventional combat. For example, a mis-strike resulting in substantial civilian 
casualties was possible and could have quickly increased the stakes of the crisis. Pakistan, 
responding quickly to the Balakot strike with its own airstrike, was proportional in that it 
occurred, but did not damage any Indian infrastructure or personnel. It is thus reasonable 
to imagine a proportional response to a strike harming civilian or military targets, 
accidental or otherwise. 
The captured Indian pilot in Pakistan presented additional risks for dangerous 
escalation and unpredictable outcomes. Had the pilot been captured and then mistreated or 
killed by Islamic militants that operate within the region, the event could have provided 
justification for more provocative behavior from India. Thankfully this did not occur, but 
the potential for such happenings exists any time belligerents engage in air combat over 
enemy territory. 
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Although hypothetical “what ifs” are not scientific, the “fog of war” is an oft-cited 
and very real component of any military campaign.184 Furthermore, Pakistan had 
responded that it had no choice but retaliate against Indian airstrikes, but in a proportional 
way. Pakistan’s historic paranoia of its lack of strategic depth and military inferiority 
compels such actions. This also incentivizes Pakistan to showcase its nuclear capability 
against India’s overwhelming conventional advantage when it perceives an existential 
threat. 
2. Assessing the International Dynamic 
The United States’ less direct intervention from its executive branch compared to 
past crises in South Asia may be telling of its strategic shift toward India and away from 
Pakistan. This choice may have less to do with the Kashmir problem and be more in line 
with U.S. strategic interest to check China’s increasing global influence. The U.S. approach 
during the Pulwama crisis contrasted significantly with two other high profile J&K crises: 
Robert Gates’ personal visit to Islamabad and New Delhi in the midst of the 1990 stand-
off and President Clinton’s Whitehouse meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister during the 
Kargil War. Both events are viewed as critical actions in the subsequent de-escalation.185 
In Pulwama crisis however, India was given maneuver space to employ a military response 
in Pakistan, thus altering the status quo of the larger, ongoing nuclear relationship between 
the two nations.  
In contrast, Pakistan’s relationship with China has steadily grown as China has 
aggressively invested in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key component 
to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, China’s post Pulwama crisis blocking of 
UNSC blacklisting of the JeM leader and then subsequent support of the amendment may 
represent a changing policy for China regarding Pakistan’s jihadist problem. China’s 
massive investments in CPEC prioritizes a strong relationship with the Pakistani state, but 
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also requires security for its workers and to ensure the projects are completed effectively. 
In addition, China has incentives to quell outsourcing Islamic terrorism groups from 
Pakistan that have supported the Uighur cause within China’s restive Xinjiang province.186 
However, China has been quick to support Pakistan against their common adversary, India, 
with respect to Modi’s revocation of Article 370. Therefore, this crisis presents China with 
an interesting conflict between securing its ungoverned spaces, supporting a close ally 
against a common adversary, and protecting its economic interests.187  
One must also acknowledge Prime Minister Ihram Khan’s measured and diplomatic 
response throughout February 2019 as a positive aspect in the resolution of the Pulwama 
crisis. He admonished the attacks, requested evidence linking the attack to Pakistan, 
expressed support for counterterrorism, and ultimately took measures that ended the crisis. 
This may signal a shift in bilateral diplomatic problem-solving over Kashmir, whereas U.S. 
third-party intervention had been the traditional norm in crisis management. Perhaps Khan 
reasoned that Pakistan’s own economic woes, failed responses to terrorism, and 
international isolation during the event required a more conciliarity tone in order to avoid 
further international isolation. The international community had increasingly sought to 
blame Pakistan for its proliferation of proxy force terrorism and thus hold them 
accountable.188 Thus, Pakistan did not have its third party safety valve and was compelled 
to deescalate or face greater consequences.  
Khan’s steady diplomatic approach and acknowledgment of potential nuclear 
escalation, followed by the punctual release of the Indian pilot, does provide a level of 
optimism regarding stability within the context of the Pulwama crisis. However, this does 
not demonstrate a revolution in Pakistani crisis management with regards to J&K. 
Although the politically powerful Pakistan military supported Prime Minister Khan’s 
 
186 Barbara Kelemen, “China’s Changing Response to Militancy in Pakistan,” International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, September 2, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/09/csdp-militancy-in-
pakistan. 
187 Vinay Kaura. “India’s Pakistan Policy: From 2016 ‘Surgical Strike’ to 2019 Balakot ‘Airstrike,’” 
Round Table (London) 109, no. 3 (May 3, 2020): 282, https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2020.1760499. 
188 Ashley J. Tellis, “A Smoldering Volcano: Pakistan and Terrorism after Balakot,” Carnegie 
Endowment For International Peace, March 14, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/14/
smoldering-volcano-pakistan-and-terrorism-after-balakot-pub-78593. 
64 
approach in this most recent crisis, that is no guarantee in future instances that it will be as 
willing to cooperate with less bellicose action.189  
The dominating nature of Pakistan’s military becomes increasingly problematic 
when one analyzes its monopoly of the nuclear weapons program and its integration into 
conventional forces. This strategy lowers the threshold of nuclear use and raises the 
legitimacy of deterrence against India’s conventional threat. However, in the case of a crisis 
with high degrees of volatility and unknown behavior, such arrangements enhance the 
likelihood of an accidental launch or rapid employment without civilian authorization. As 
described by Vipin Narang in Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Pakistan’s nuclear 
arrangements “favor offensive strategies and procedures that allow the retention of the 
initiative and independence, and take steps to minimize interference.”190 For Prime 
Minister Khan and the international community at large, such arrangements become 
increasingly disturbing if conventional military force altercations between adversaries 
occur more frequently, thereby increasing the probability of mishaps, misestimations, and 
provocations. In the past, open diplomatic communication channels provided a level of 
stability that sought to minimize uncertainty.191 However, the rapidity of escalation in a 
kinetic environment and Pakistan’s decentralized and conventionally integrated command 
and control structure of nuclear weapons could outpace such procedures. 
Modi’s “successful” Balakot airstrikes could cause him to be more apt to push the 
boundary of escalation in a future event similar to the Pulwama crisis. Modi has already 
demonstrated his own revisionist aims within J&K by stripping its autonomy through 
revocation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution just five months after the Pulwama 
crisis. In this instance, there will likely be greater emphasis by the Pakistan military to 
respond decisively and lower the nuclear threshold to deter the rising aggression of Modi’s 
nationalistic approach. 
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The Pulwama crisis shattered the historic norms of deterrence within the context of 
the ongoing J&K dispute. India demonstrated that it would respond with conventional 
military airpower in the wake of terrorist violence against jihadists groups based in 
Pakistan’s sovereign territory. This precedent-breaking response resulted in an 
unpredictable crisis that left space for rapid escalation, but was de-escalated through 
diplomatic intervention on behalf of Pakistan. The episode also lacked the leverage of U.S. 
crisis management efforts as seen in past crises. Although the crisis concluded peacefully, 
largely due to Prime Minister Khan’s de-escalatory rhetoric and actions, questions remain 
regarding future regional stability in the event of another J&K crisis. 
The catalysts for this crisis still exist, making a future event probable: Pakistan-
based militias continue to operate with near impunity and disenfranchised Kashmiri 
Muslims still reject Indian rule and counterinsurgency methods. The developing polarity 
between the U.S. and China coupled with Pakistan’s and India’s willingness to engage in 
escalating military action beyond the near-50 year status quo will likely define future crises 
in the region.  
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VI. FINDINGS AND APPLICATION TO NUCLEAR-ARMED 
REGIONAL POWERS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter relates common themes observed and analyzed within the case studies 
that will further shape the Kashmir conflict space. The first portion of this chapter contends 
three points. First, Pakistan has successfully leveraged nuclear deterrence in its irregular 
warfare campaign in J&K. Second, the international community accepts irregular warfare 
violence in J&K while focusing on crisis management efforts. Third, Pakistan has 
manipulated the interests of global powers to strengthen its security posture and continue 
its irregular warfare campaign in J&K. The second part will acknowledge the changing 
dynamics surrounding the Kashmir dispute as a consequence of the growing U.S.–China 
competition within the region. This section will demonstrate the near-term escalation risks 
associated with the evolving relationships between a Chinese-backed Pakistan and U.S.-
aligned India. It will also identify potential long-term stabilization opportunities regarding 
counterterrorism in which the U.S. and China have shared interests. The final section 
applies the Kashmir case to regional powers who may choose to pair their irregular warfare 
approach with nuclear capability in future. 
B. PART I: FINDINGS 
1. Leveraging Irregular Warfare as a Nuclear Power 
Pakistan’s irregular warfare and nuclear deterrent dynamic has created freedom of 
maneuver for its revisionist goals within Kashmir. The three crises analyzed in this study 
focused exclusively on Kashmir, coupled with other escalatory events based on terrorist 
attacks in India, represent instances where irregular warfare had broken India’s threshold 
of acceptable violence while also imposing significant costs upon them. However, Indian 
failed to respond decisively due in large part to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capability.  
Nuclear optimists and pessimists debate whether nuclear weapons have ultimately 
stabilized or destabilized South Asia, but research is quite conclusive that they have created 
operational space for Pakistan-supported irregular warriors to conduct an insurgency at 
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varying degrees of intensity in the over 30 years of Pakistan’s nuclear status.192 Nuclear 
weapons—ranging the entire spectrum of de facto to advanced capability—have 
successfully empowered Pakistan’s protracted irregular warfare strategy while fostering its 
existential vulnerability to India. Thus, nuclear optimists are correct in that India and 
Pakistan have yet to engage in large scale military action since the nuclearization of South 
Asia; while nuclear pessimists accurately highlight how increasing levels of violence have 
been vitalized within the nuclear shadow.  
Judging by the aforementioned factors, Pakistan will continue to support irregular 
warfare activities indefinitely. However, these efforts will not decisively wrest control of 
J&K from India as initially desired at the outset of this irregular warfare campaign. India 
has constantly reaffirmed its willingness to defend this territory over the last 30 years as 
detailed in this project’s case studies. In addition, Prime Minister Modi’s August 2019 
abrogation of Article 370 of India’s Constitution, which protected Kashmir’s semi-
autonomous status, further demonstrates India’s willingness to take significant steps to 
assert control over the region.193  
Although recent Indian counterinsurgency efforts are threatening to its irregular 
warfare campaign, they also present Pakistan the ability to leverage Kashmiri domestic 
discontent to maintain the insurgency while also bringing to the forefront human rights 
issues within J&K and other xenophobic policies against Muslims employed by India. In 
addition, continued security concerns in Kashmir compels India to commit a large portion 
of its military to maintain security in the region. There are currently over 400,000 Indian 
security forces located in the region as of 2019 conducting stability and counterinsurgency 
operations.194 In Pakistan’s strategic estimate, these troops are thus unavailable to threaten 
Islamabad directly.  
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Data suggests that the increased focus of Indian security forces in Kashmir since 
August 2019 has decreased overall terrorist attacks, but there is also evidence of increased 
infiltration by Pakistan insurgents into J&K.195 Restrictive measures enforced by Indian 
security forces in response to COVID-19 have raised discontent among Kashmiris, thus 
setting conditions for an escalatory event at any time. An oppressive regime, restless 
population, and Pakistan-based infiltrators indicate the situation is ripe for another 
escalatory event in Kashmir.196  
Pakistan can also use this opportunity to shape the information environment in its 
favor which it has largely been lost over the last two decades. The Kargil War, 2001, 2008, 
and 2019 crises all resulted in international outrage as Pakistan was held responsible for 
supporting terrorist activities with extremely dangerous implications outside of the 
Kashmir region and risking nuclear escalation. This contrasted drastically from the 1990 
crisis and corresponding empathy for Kashmiris by the international community due to 
draconian Indian counterinsurgency measures.197 Pakistan will likely continue to highlight 
India’s rededication to strenuous counterinsurgency activities since 2019 to embarrass 
India and call into question the legitimacy of the world’s most populace democracy.198 
Furthermore, a rejuvenated and post-modern insurgency movement has taken root 
that enhances the risk of a near-future crisis resembling that of 2019. Recent reports 
indicate a new Pakistan-based group called The Resistance Front (TRF) has been 
infiltrating into J&K and fomenting grassroots resistance of Kashmiris against India’s 
recent counterinsurgency methods. Most notably, the TRF possesses technical capability 
to employ VPNs and bypass India’s digital restrictions within Kashmir to disperse 
propaganda to the population. The Resistance Front has leveraged banned social media 
outlets and circumvented these restrictions to maintain relevance in the midst of renewed 
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lockdowns under the auspices of COVID-19 prevention.199 Happymon Jacob 
demonstrates the changing and potentially escalating dynamic of this group: 
A newly minted terrorist group in Kashmir, The Resistance Front (TRF), 
which Indian officials believe is controlled by the Pakistan-based jihadi 
group Lashkar-e-Taiba, has been organizing major terror attacks. Indian 
officials suspect that the TRF has been created to give terror in Kashmir an 
indigenous face, thereby reducing international pressure, especially from 
the antiterror financing watchdog Financial Action Task Force, on Pakistan. 
No one doubts that an indigenous militancy exists in Kashmir, but no one 
also doubts that it is actively aided and abetted by the Pakistani side.200  
This suggests that an escalatory incident similar to the 2019 crisis exists as well as 
uncertainty about the intensity of response Prime Minister Modi is willing to bring to bear 
in the event of the crisis. The tenuous security situation, willingness to leverage uncertain 
escalation and brinksmanship, and emerging bipolarity of China-U.S. relations within 
South Asia increases the risks of nuclear escalation beyond that of past crises detailed in 
this thesis. 
2. Third Party Intervention Limited to Crisis Management 
Third party intervention focused on escalation management is also a common trend 
within past Kashmir crises. Although there are varying levels of international intervention 
and partiality based on perceived transgressions of either Pakistan or India during each 
crisis, the international community has remained neutral regarding the underlining 
Kashmir sovereignty dispute. The UN has stood by the 1972 Simla Accords as the guiding 
document for determination of the LoC separating Pakistan and India’s jurisdiction of the 
region while also urging restraint and commitment to resolving the dispute peacefully.201  
With regard to past Kashmir crises, the international community places its greatest 
emphasis during escalatory events. The United States assumed a pivotal role in the 1990 
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crisis and the Kargil War of 1999 regarding de-escalation, while maintaining a less 
aggressive intervention status during the 2019 crisis. However, it still urged de-escalation 
of the latter conflict, albeit later in the event.202 As crisis management is prioritized with 
regard to Kashmir, this signals a normalized and accepted level of insurgency violence 
tolerated by the international community. This was best illustrated during the 1990 case 
study when following the demobilization of Pakistan and Indian troops that ultimately 
reduced tensions, levels of violence within Kashmir continued to rise and then level off at 
a heightened state for the next decade.203 This represented focus on resolving the 
immediate crisis instead of the Kashmir conflict itself. In addition, efforts by the UN 
following the Kargil War and the 2019 crisis to hold Pakistan accountable for irregular 
warfare within Kashmir or India’s accused human rights violations have not resulted in 
tangible changes in the conflict’s dynamics.204 In short, the Kashmir problem is viewed as 
a regional dispute until the conflict implications fall outside of the bounds of irregular 
warfare and encompass a more widespread regional threat. 
This suggests that the international community will continue to monitor the 
ongoing conflict from afar with an understanding that insurgency warfare will remain a 
constant, but will engage more deliberately when significant changes occur outside this 
status quo. This may include a large scale terrorist attack, vitriolic rhetoric between Indian 
and Pakistan regarding nuclear weapon use, or other forms of nuclear signaling either 
above board or intercepted through intelligence collection. However, this approach is not 
without risks as it leaves space for rapid escalation that could outpace third party de-
escalation efforts. 
3. Exploiting Global Power Priorities 
Pakistan’s leveraging of superpowers and regional Islamic allies are proven 
constants that it will continue to employ to mitigate fears of international isolation and 
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strategic dominance by India. Pakistan has demonstrated its ability to manipulate the shifts 
in the global security environment, be it the Cold War, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 
or Great Power Competition to ensure its national survival and that of its nuclear weapons 
arsenal; while also maintaining its ability to violently confront India in Kashmir. Prior to 
its working relationship with the U.S. against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and then 
after 9/11 against Al Qaeda, Pakistan leveraged diplomatic support from China against 
Soviet-supported India in the 1960s.205 Pakistan was also able to fund its nuclear program 
with Saudi Arabian support following the 1971 Bangladesh War with India.206 Less than 
a decade later, the U.S. provided funding for the mujahedeen in the Soviet-Afghan War 
while the ISI secretly directed portions of this investment to support the latent Kashmir 
insurgency. More decisively was the U.S. willingness to look the other way while Pakistan 
crossed the nuclear finish line in exchange for covert support against the Soviet Union in 
the 1980s.207 Once the Soviet Union left Afghanistan and ultimately collapsed, the U.S. 
reaffirmed its counter-proliferation policy against Pakistan and imposed sanctions. This 
drove Pakistan again closer to China until the U.S. renewed its counterterrorism partnership 
with Pakistan following 9/11.208 
As a frustrated U.S. divests from its tenuous GWOT ally in Pakistan for a closer 
relationship to India as a regional balance to China, Pakistan has pivoted to China for 
protection and economic growth.209 Most notably, Pakistan is leveraging China’s 
aggressive policy of economic expansion by facilitating CPEC investments within its 
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borders. In turn, China’s willingness to publicly criticize India’s recent counterinsurgency 
efforts in support of Pakistan demonstrates aligning interests.210 
C. PART II: EMERGING  GREAT POWER COMPETITION CHALLENGES 
AND OPPORTUNITIES  
1. Escalation Risk and the U.S.-China Rivalry 
Shifting Great Power dynamics within South Asia have increased uncertainty and 
risks associated with nuclear escalation in Kashmir in the near term. In response to 
Pakistan’s ambivalence toward U.S. and NATO counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan 
since 9/11, the Trump Administration ceased defense funding for Pakistan in 2018. 
Furthermore, the U.S. has strengthened its defense relationship with India by selling them 
advanced military technology, presenting Pakistan with additional security concerns.211 
With souring U.S. relations, Pakistan has turned to China for economic and military 
support. China’s $46 billion investment in CPEC has drawn the two countries closer 
throughout the last decade.212 In addition, heightened tensions over the China-India border 
near J&K also increase complexity within the region that has not existed during the era of 
Pakistan-India nuclear rivalry.213 
As described in the 2019 Case Study, Prime Minister Modi was not only willing to 
alter the traditional status quo by conducting airstrikes inside sovereign Pakistan, but 
amend the Indian Constitution to grasp greater control of the traditionally semi-
autonomous J&K region only months after the crisis. Worth noting, the latter event was 
seen quite favorably by the Hindu majority and increasingly nationalistic population within 
India. Perhaps its growing relationship with the U.S coupled with increasing Hindu 
nationalism has granted Modi greater confidence to push historic boundaries. However, 
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China’s recent aggressive approach in its own border dispute against India may also signal 
tacit support for Pakistan’s same issue,  potentially providing a tenuous balance to Indian 
military response in the region.214  
Because the 2019 crisis has fundamentally altered the status quo agreement and 
Modi has leveraged nationalistic support to change domestic policy regarding Kashmir, 
Pakistan could reason that it has lost credibility of its nuclear threat from which it had 
enjoyed in decades prior. With this called into question, the unknowns of future crisis 
predictability in the region may cause Pakistan to rethink its nuclear posture to reestablish 
deterrence. Pakistan could reestablish deterrence in the face of Modi’s aggressive response 
posture, but such actions would substantially increase the risk of accidental or uncontrolled 
escalation. In the event of another crisis, Pakistan could choose to mate its nuclear 
warheads with its delivery systems, deploy its tactical nuclear systems, and delegate launch 
authority of these systems in an attempt to reestablish its threat credibility in the face of  
emerging threats. This would fundamentally increase the risk of accidental escalation while 
also compelling India to match or supersede Pakistan’s nuclear posture as a preventative 
measure. As India may leverage its growing relationship with the U.S. in the midst of 
another crisis, Pakistan may attempt to exploit Chinese support as a counter to U.S. 
influence in Asia. Invoking the growing U.S.–China rivalry into the historic Kashmir 
dispute adds an additional layer of uncertainty since the unknowns of credible deterrence 
have been called into question, Modi has demonstrated a greater willingness to 
aggressively respond to a crisis, and Pakistan maintains its obsession with Indian security 
dominance as its greatest threat to national security.  
2. Great Power Stabilization Opportunity 
As discussed, Kashmir’s instability lends itself to another escalatory event near-
term. However, do the Chinese and American shared interest in preventing Pakistan-based 
terrorism provide an opportunity to stabilize South Asia in the long-term? As the unknowns 
of Great Power Competition sour relations between the U.S. and China, opportunities for 
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cooperation regarding Pakistan-based Islamic terrorism could provide an opportunity to 
deescalate the Kashmir problem and provide bipartisan mitigation of escalation risk.  
For China, the concerns over jihadism are twofold. First, China sees jihadism 
internal to Pakistan as compromising to its economic investments under CPEC as it 
threatens to compromise various infrastructure projects: roads, dams, and the Gwadar Port. 
This was clearly demonstrated when  jihadists killed at least 46 Chinese workers in a two-
year period alone, as reported in 2016. Pakistan subsequently committed 10,000 troops to 
protect the CPEC project sites and workers. With Pakistan estimating that CPEC will create 
700,000 jobs and result in 2.5 percent growth by 2030, CPEC could potentially provide the 
economic stimulus Pakistan desperately needs. Economic improvement would likely 
curtail the radicalization of Pakistan youth as jobs and future opportunities would be more 
available.215 As Corinne Graff succinctly summarizes in her work Poverty, Development 
and Violent Extremism in Weak States, “uneducated and often impoverished young men 
with few employment prospects often are being recruited to join violent extremist groups 
in exchange for financial rewards.”216 CPEC could provide the economic stimulus that 
frustrates recruitment into extremist groups of Pakistan’s most vulnerable population. 
Second, jihadism emanating from Pakistan has been a source of support for the 
Uighurs as they struggle to oppose draconian Chinese policies themselves, not dissimilar 
(and likely worse) than those experienced by Muslim Kashmiris in J&K.217 As China seeks 
to quell its internal populations, it has incentive to prevent Pakistan’s outsourcing of 
jihadis. With the carrot of CPEC, China has already employed the stick against Pakistan to 
protect its investment and secure its borders with Pakistan. China has signaled a willingness 
to hold Pakistan accountable for its harboring of terrorists, most notably supporting the 
UNSC sanctions against JeM leader Muhammed Azhar, reversing previous objections. In 
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addition, China supported placing Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force Grey List 
for monetary support of terrorism in 2019.218 Perhaps Chinese influence in Pakistan may 
compel Pakistan to reduce its leveraging of jihadists and conduct more robust domestic 
counterterrorism operations to maintain it’s working relationship with the rising power.  
With respect to the U.S., growing partnership with India also presents a potential 
opportunity to shape Indian policy within Kashmir and reduce tensions. The draconian 
measures—mass arrests, media blackouts, police brutality, incarcerations—following the 
2019 crisis and then renewed during the COVID-19 lockdown has set conditions for a new 
generation of violent insurgency. Perhaps leveraging a stronger position regarding human 
rights issues within J&K by persuading Modi’s administration to loosen laws that alienate 
Muslims could address the grievances that fuel the ongoing insurgency. With China’s focus 
on economic investment within Pakistan, the U.S’s relationship could potentially seek to 
shore up international opinion against India’s human rights-violating counterinsurgency 
efforts. However, the United States has been hesitant to confront these issues as they are 
substantial friction points that could compromise its growing relationship with India as a 
counter against China.219  
Although U.S.–China shared counterterrorism interests in South Asia present an 
opportunity regarding the Kashmir problem, there are significant risks associated with this 
approach. Specifically, if CPEC does not result in economic vitality for Pakistan and it is 
unable to answer its debts, Pakistan could spiral into greater economic turmoil. These 
conditions would further lend themselves to radicalization and potentially threaten the 
Pakistan state itself. With India’s radical policy changes toward J&K, as well as feeling of 
international isolation, Pakistan may become more willing to aggressively seek revision in 
Kashmir by justifying its claim of protecting India’s Muslim minority. In addition, Chinese 
and India’s suspect human rights record—specifically against Muslims—could eventually 
mobilize international jihadist organizations to take action against these countries and 
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further risk escalation in Kashmir.220 Although Pakistan and the rest of the Muslim world 
has yet to publicly admonish China over the Uighur human rights issues for fear of 
economic reprisals, shifting rhetoric could in itself precipitate crisis.221  
Risks abound with the Kashmir crisis. Pakistan’s continued focus on irregular 
warfare, uncertainty following the 2019 Pulwama crisis, and the evolving Great Power 
Competition dynamic within South Asia present escalation risks between India and 
Pakistan. Shared U.S. and Chinese interests regarding a stable Pakistan and its outsourcing 
of international terrorism demonstrate rare congruency of policy within the region that 
could help normalize tensions in South Asia. However, India’s anti-Muslim policy needs 
to be addressed to target one source of contention within Kashmir to quell the insurgency. 
The economic effects of CPEC, Pakistan’s continued support of irregular warfare, and 
suppressive Indian policies in Kashmir are variables that will drive the likelihood of 
escalation in a future Kashmir crisis. In addition, if CPEC does not stimulate Pakistan’s 
economy and India gains greater influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan may find itself 
precariously isolated, both geographically and economically. This may lead Pakistan to 
regress to a more aggressive and survivalist mentality, similar to its pursuit of nuclear 
weapons at all costs following its disastrous defeat in 1971. 
D. PART III: APPLYING THE KASHMIR DYNAMIC TO REGIONAL 
POWERS 
In many ways, the Kashmir problem is unique in its ongoing struggle under the 
nuclear shadow between two neighboring adversaries. However, the conflict may provide 
a lens for viewing future regional irregular warfare strategies enabled by nuclear weapons. 
As multiple regional powers—such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey—have 
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signaled interest in nuclear capability, the Pakistan-India situation provides a context to 
view these future security dilemmas.222  
The first takeaway is the level of maneuverability demonstrated by irregular 
warfare when supported by a nuclear-armed client state. The mere possession of nuclear 
weapons provides a threat credibility that will enable irregular warfare. The 
counterinsurgent state will—at least initially—struggle to properly tailor a response that 
manages the threat in a manner that does not uncontrollably escalate the situation. The 
aggressor can further leverage uncertainty through issuing ambiguous redlines for nuclear 
use and communicating vague rhetoric from leaders to signal a willingness to employ its 
arsenal. When leveraging proxy forces, one’s opponent is forced to weigh its response 
which allows the aggressor to exploit this period of indecisiveness. 
The second takeaway is the importance of global powers to maintain open 
communication and ameliorate tensions during a nuclear-charged regional crisis. During 
multiple crises, Pakistan and India looked to the international community to broker peace 
between the two countries as a face saving initiative and to deescalate tensions.223 As 
regional powers and leaders are focused on developing their international status while also 
addressing domestic issues, the third party broker allows adversaries to deescalate without 
backing down. This “safety valve” permits both powers to maintain credibility, and even 
declare victory, while avoiding uncontrollable escalation.  
Weaker powers may also conduct nuclear signaling to compel a global power into 
the crisis. This approach is especially effective if the weaker power feels that it has lost the 
upper-hand within the crisis or fears a deleterious outcome, but does not want to yield in 
the face of its adversary. Pakistan likely employed this approach during the 1990 crisis, 
which resulted in U.S. direct diplomatic intervention that swiftly reduced tensions.224  
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The third takeaway is the inherent risk of uncontrolled escalation due to irregular 
warfare. Regional powers, especially a weak state compared to its competitor (as Pakistan 
is to India), are likely to be exceptionally concerned with territorial integrity and regime 
survival. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, opting for proxy warfare below the 
threshold of total war often does escalate into conventional military exchange or nuclear 
posturing. These conditions, although controlled and deescalated in the case studies 
analyzed, does raise concern over a potentially rapid and overwhelming response. This 
may precipitate swift escalation of nuclear systems, including deployment and 
decentralized command and control of these weapons as a result. This enhances uncertainty 
and risk that may proceed too rapidly to be de-escalated through diplomatic channels 
between adversaries or a third party. 
Finally, an irregular warfare strategy under the nuclear shadow is not necessarily 
decisive and presents substantial risks beyond nuclear escalation to the patron state. As 
demonstrated with Pakistan’s campaign, it has not achieved its long term goal of wresting 
sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir; although it has accomplished a limited objective of 
tying down hundreds of thousands of Indian security forces in the region.225 However, 
defeat during the Kargil War and incessant terrorism resonating from its borders has 
brought admonishment from the international community. In addition, Pakistan’s support 
of proxy groups has backfired as domestic terrorism threatens its sovereignty and has 
substantially decreased its worldwide credibility.226 
E. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan’s thirty-year irregular warfare campaign in Kashmir, nested below South 
Asia’s nuclear shadow, has defined the fledgling nation’s grand strategy against India. It 
has succeeded in leveraging its nuclear status for freedom of maneuver at the sub-
conventional level, but has risked nuclear escalation in the three major crises described in 
this thesis. Within the context of the U.S.–China Great Power Competition relationship 
within South Asia, the Kashmir problem proves a potential flashpoint for nuclear escalation 
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than experienced in previous crises. Pakistan continues to support the Kashmiri insurgency 
as India doubles down on harsher counterinsurgency policies within the restive region. 
However, Chinese economic investment and incentives for counterterrorism policies 
within Pakistan could provide congruency with U.S. initiatives in the region, even as the 
U.S. draws closer to India. As the long-term payoffs to Pakistan over CPEC remain 
unknown and India continues to alienate its Muslim population, the Kashmir problem 
remains tenuous. In order to quell unnecessary or unintentional escalation and 
misunderstanding, the U.S. and China should demonstrate stability through direct crisis 
management during a highly probable escalatory event resonating from Kashmir in the 
near future. In addition, the U.S. should leverage its position as a leading democracy and 
human rights advocate to confront India’s anti-Muslim policies to promote deradicalization 
in the region. 
Pakistan’s approach to the Kashmir crisis represents a unique lens for analyzing 
challenges of future nuclear-armed regional powers. The freedom of maneuver available 
under the nuclear shadow will likely be exploited by weaker regional powers while also 
presenting a significant escalatory risk. In addition, global powers will remain relevant to 
provide open communication and third-party intervention to reduce the risk of rapid or 
accidental nuclear escalation. However, reliance on irregular warfare comes with severe 
liabilities such as the empowerment of uncontrollable militant groups causing domestic 
and international instability. These burdens may outweigh the benefits and compromise the 
overall prosperity of the client state. 
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